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REGULATING UNICORNS: DISCLOSURE
AND THE NEW PRIVATE ECONOMY
JENNIFER S. FAN *
Abstract: “Unicorns” are private companies with valuations of a billion dollars
or more. As their name indicates, unicorns were originally so rare as to be almost
mythical. But Uber and other technology companies have ushered in a new era:
we now have a blessing of unicorns, each one of which has the potential to transform financial and cultural norms. Yet from a legal perspective, these behemoths
are regulated just like their much smaller, non-mythical counterparts. Unicorns’
dizzying valuations have not been matched with any expansion or recalibration
of regulation. As a result, vital information about these companies remains secret,
perhaps for years, until an IPO moves a unicorn into the public realm. This Article argues that this one-size-fits-all regulatory framework is insufficient. Though
nominally private, the size and influence of unicorns renders their effect in the
marketplace much more like that of a publicly held corporation. The fate of a
unicorn affects stockholders, employees, and regional or even national economies. Regulation of unicorns should recognize that outsized power. As a result,
this Article proposes rethinking the current regulatory regime in the context of
unicorns. This Article is the first to critique the unicorn phenomenon within the
securities regulation framework. It argues for enhanced disclosure requirements
that will alleviate the risks of unicorns without restraining their innovation. It
concludes by suggesting what types of disclosures are necessary, how such information should be disclosed, and when it should be disclosed.

INTRODUCTION
As recently as 2010, 1 a private company would not be valued at $1 billion—such a valuation was considered in the realm of fantasy. 2 But now, ven-
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Thanks also to participants in the 2016 Law & Entrepreneurship Association Annual Retreat. Julie
Liu, Cheryl Nyberg, Alena Wolotira, and Zoe Wong provided excellent scholarship support.
1
Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH
(Nov. 2, 2013), [https://perma.cc/9MZL-6MZG] (indicating that “unicorns” were relatively rare as of late
2013); cf. The Unicorn List: Current Private Companies Valued at $1B and Above, CB INSIGHTS (updated daily), https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies [https://perma.cc/3W8M-82HH]
[hereinafter Unicorn List].
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ture capital deals with dizzying valuations 3 and financings of $100 million or
more are featured prominently in the media. 4 In fact, venture capital-backed
technology companies have had more than five times the number of $500 million or more rounds from 2014 to June 2015 than the prior four years combined. 5
But what legal implications do these valuations have? What role have different investors played in creating unicorns (private companies valued at over
$1 billion) or decacorns (private companies valued at over $10 billion)? How
have the terms of venture capital deals changed in light of these lofty valuations? Have investors in unicorns been able to obtain special downside protection? Why are unicorns staying private longer? Should private companies with
these high valuations be subject to different disclosure requirements? How
does the advent of unicorns affect stockholders, employees, and local economies? Although business leaders have had robust discussions about these top2

Powerhouses like Amazon and Google were never worth $1 billion when they were private
companies. See Erin Griffith & Dan Primack, The Age of Unicorns, FORTUNE (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:00
AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/22/the-age-of-unicorns/ [https://perma.cc/DM9N-RD4V].
3
Valuations are the amounts that venture capitalists, or VCs, determine that companies are worth.
There is no exact science to this, but “VCs typically take into account many factors when deciding
how to value a potential investment—some are quantifiable whereas others are completely qualitative.” BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS: BE SMARTER THAN YOUR LAWYER AND
VENTURE CAPITALIST 39 (2011). These factors may include the stage of the company, competition
with other funding sources, experience of the entrepreneur and leadership team, the VC’s natural entry
point, financials, and the current economic climate. See id. at 39–40.
4
Evelyn M. Rusli, Startup Values Set Records, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 29, 2014, 7:50 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-startup-values-reach-the-sky-1419900636 [https://perma.cc/FJE6BND3]. In fact, financings in the technology sector commonly raise $100 million or more. The Insanely Common $100 Million+ Financing Round, CB INSIGHTS (May 21, 2015), https://www.
cbinsights.com/blog/mega-financing-round/ [https://perma.cc/62NU-BKP8]. Some private companies
have raised over $1 billion in one financing. See Forget Billion-Dollar Valuations: These 7 Companies Raised $1B or More in a Single Round, CB INSIGHTS (Oct 1, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.
com/blog/billion-dollar-rounds/ [https://perma.cc/EC4L-5FZP] (identifying Didi Kuaidi, SoFi,
Airbnb, Coupang, Uber, SpaceX, Xiaomi, Flipkart, Facebook, and JD.com as companies that raised a
billion dollars or more in a single round, and noting that Uber had raised four $1 billion rounds). The
2015 year-end review by the National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”) aptly captures the venture capital deal space:
Investment levels in 2014 were remarkable in that they were the highest amount since
2000, and the third-highest ever at $49.3 billion. This compares with $30.1 billion in
2013, which was in line with the prior several years. However, the headlines and the
dramatic increase were driven by a dozen or so companies receiving very large venture
rounds in 2014. If you remove those deals from the totals, the numbers look more traditional.
NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2015 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 9
(2015) [hereinafter NVCA YEARBOOK].
5
See The Half-Billion Dollar Round Explosion, CB INSIGHTS (June 8, 2015), https://www.cb
insights.com/blog/half-billion-dollar-explosion/?utm_source=CB+Insights+Newsletter&utm_campaign=
84673cad32-500MRound06_09_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9dc0513989-84673cad3286759461 [https://perma.cc/C2KU-M5N4].

2016]

Regulating Unicorns

585

ics, legal scholars have remained relatively silent about the implications of
unicorns in the transactional law context. In particular, scholars have not
looked at whether unicorns should have disclosure obligations similar to public
companies and what the ramifications are for employees and minority stockholders when companies stay private longer. 6
This Article argues that once a private company reaches unicorn status, it
should be subject to some of the same reporting obligations as public companies to provide greater transparency and protect minority stockholders (i.e.,
employees). Although venture capital investors expect that the companies they
invest in provide certain financial information to them (which is then memorialized in an investors’ rights agreement), 7 other stockholders and interested
parties typically do not have rights to such information. In particular, minority
investors and other stockholders, such as employees or former employees who
have exercised stock options, have limited or no rights to obtain financial information and other information relevant to making an investment decision.
Although the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 20128 (“JOBS Act”) was
intended to democratize the equity investment process, it did not adequately
consider the implications of large private companies staying private longer by
raising significant sums of money without the scrutiny of the public markets
and their related disclosure, audit, and legal obligations. Many scholars have
offered various viewpoints about the value and impact of disclosure generally,9
but no one has analyzed whether this one-size-fits-all regulatory framework for
private companies is sufficient for unicorns. This Article is the first to offer a
proposal for how to regulate private companies when they enter the unicorn
category and their valuations and impact equal or surpass that of public companies.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains what a unicorn is and
what role it plays in the current innovation ecosystem. 10 It then provides an
overview of a venture capital deal, the importance of Regulation D, and the
legal documents that are used to memorialize it. 11 Part II argues that although
unicorns are technically private companies, their size and influence render
their effect in the marketplace much more like that of a publicly held corporation. 12 The fate of a unicorn affects stockholders, employees, and regional or
even national economies. Therefore, regulation of unicorns should recognize
6

To be clear, scholars have suggested tiered systems of disclosure, but in contexts other than
unicorns. See infra notes 98–167 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure).
7
See infra notes 87–91 (providing more information on investors’ rights agreements).
8
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
9
See infra notes 98–167 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure).
10
See infra notes 19–97 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 45–97 and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes 98–167 and accompanying text.
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that outsized power and create new tools for the care and feeding of unicorns
to alleviate their risks without restraining their innovation. Part III analyzes the
Form D 13 filings and Restated Certificates of Incorporation of five prominent
unicorns—Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”), Dropbox, Inc. (“Dropbox”), Pinterest, Inc.
(“Pinterest”), Snapchat, Inc. (“Snapchat”), and Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber”)—to demonstrate the failings of the current regulatory regime. 14 This Part
delves into what type of information is available, where more information
needs to be disclosed, and what the implications may be for minority stockholders and employees based on publicly available information.15 Finally, Part
IV looks at the new trend of late mega-fundings, also known as “private IPOs”
(initial public offerings) 16 for unicorns, which allows these companies to continue to operate with little transparency. 17 This Article concludes that private
IPOs only exacerbate the problems with transparency and equity that different
stockholders of unicorns currently face, and further illustrate the need for enhanced disclosure. 18
I. THE RISE OF THE UNICORNS AND THE ANATOMY OF
A VENTURE CAPITAL DEAL
A. The Rise of the Unicorns: The New Normal
Aileen Lee, founder of Cowboy Ventures, famously coined the phrase
“unicorns,” describing companies valued at a billion dollars or more, in her
seminal article in TechCrunch in 2013. 19 At that time, thirty-nine companies
were identified in the unicorn category, which translated into roughly “0.7 per-

13

Form D, Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.
gov/about/forms/formd.pdf [https://perma.cc/55JN-CCWW]. If an issuer of securities relies on an
exemption from registration provided in Regulation D, it must file a Form D with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and with any state that requires it, within fifteen calendar days after
the “date of first sale” of securities in an offering containing the information requested. Id.; see also
infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing Form D requirements).
14
See infra notes 168–321 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 168–321 and accompanying text.
16
A so-called “private IPO” is not an initial public offering at all. Because the median IPO raises
$101 million, private companies that have financings that raise more than $100 million have become
known as private IPOs. Data: There Are Now Over 9x More Private IPOs Than Actual Tech IPOs,
CB INSIGHTS (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/private-ipo-tech/ [https://perma.cc/
N2YY-XWCJ].
17
See infra notes 322–345 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 346–348 and accompanying text.
19
Ms. Lee’s definition of unicorn included venture-backed “U.S.-based software companies . . .
valued at over $1 billion by public or private market investors” founded between 2003 and 2013. Lee,
supra note 1. The definition of unicorn now applies to private companies with valuations of $1 billion
or more. Id.
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cent of venture-backed consumer and enterprise software startups.” 20 This
would equate to one in 1538 companies of that kind becoming unicorns. 21 Ms.
Lee noted that in the previous decade there were four new unicorns per year on
average, with Facebook being a “super-unicorn.” 22 Further, liquidity events 23
for unicorns took place, on average, more than seven years from the founding
of the company. 24 Recently, it was reported that a startup has a 1.28% chance
of achieving unicorn status. 25 “Interestingly, 15 companies [that] raised their
first round of financing in 2013 or 2014 have already jumped into the billion
dollar club highlighting the increasing pace at which unicorns are anointed.”26
At first glance, the moniker “unicorn” seems appropriate for the elite
companies achieving valuations of a billion dollars or more. Each of the members of this unicorn club represents disruptive innovation that has the potential
to change the face of how we use everyday services, how we communicate
with others, and how we interact with technology in every facet of our lives.
Upon closer inspection, however, these so-called unicorns are not a rarity. In
fact, the number of unicorns has continued to climb at what some may say is
an alarming speed, and now blessings 27 of unicorns abound. Interestingly, the
legal underpinnings for the venture capital deals in the unicorn realm have remained largely unchanged despite these dizzying valuations.
Unicorns are now ubiquitous. 28 Indeed, some entrepreneurs have one objective when raising money—reaching a billion-dollar valuation. 29 As one
20

Id. But cf. Fred Wilson, The Billion Dollar Valuation Club, AVC (Nov. 3, 2013), http://
avc.com/2013/11/the-billion-dollar-valuation-club/ [https://perma.cc/PV75-5RVZ] (disputing the
actual numbers that Ms. Lee used).
21
As Ms. Lee observed, “The tech news may make it seem like there’s a winner being born every
minute—but the reality is, the odds are somewhere between catching a foul ball at an MLB game and
being struck by lightning in one’s lifetime. Or, more than 100x harder than getting into Stanford.”
Lee, supra note 1.
22
See id. (defining a super-unicorn as a private or public company worth more than $100 billion).
Ms. Lee claims that one to three such super-unicorns are born each decade. Id. Past unicorns were
Google and Amazon in the 1990s, Cisco in the 1980s, Apple, Oracle, and Microsoft in the 1970s, and
Intel in the 1960s. Id.
23
Liquidity events are either initial public offerings or a merger or acquisition in the venture
capital context. In the deal documents for a venture capital financing, the definition of what constitutes a liquidity event is negotiated.
24
Lee, supra note 1.
25
Your Startup Has a 1.28% Chance of Becoming a Unicorn, CB INSIGHTS (May 25, 2015),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/unicorn-conversion-rate/ [https://perma.cc/KXD4-TBDP].
26
Id.
27
A group of unicorns is called a blessing. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Here’s Why the Tech Unicorns’ Dreams Won’t Come True, FORTUNE (Oct. 16, 2015, 6:08 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/10/
16/unicorns-ipo-market/ [https://perma.cc/EB8R-4EQZ]; Alan Murray, A Blessing of Unicorns, FORTUNE (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/22/a-blessing-of-unicorns/ [https://perma.
cc/78WL-RHRU].
28
The Increasingly Crowded Unicorn Club in One Infographic, CB INSIGHTS (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/increasingly-crowded-unicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/QUN8-GYBY].
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startup founder said of the billion-dollar valuation, “It does make a difference
psychologically. One billion is better than $800 million because it’s the psychological threshold for potential customers, employees, and the press.”30 Venture capital database CB Insights maintains a real-time list of these unicorns.31
The number of unicorns rose especially quickly in 2015; 32 in the second quarter of 2015, a new unicorn emerged every three business days. 33 As of March
16, 2016, the top ten unicorns were collectively valued at a staggering $234.5
billion. 34 To put this in perspective, this valuation equals nearly forty-three
percent of the total valuation of the 155 private companies identified as unicorns. 35 Furthermore, the valuations of some of these unicorns surpass those of
companies that recently went public, such as Box—provider of a secure content platform for businesses—and Twitter—an online social networking site
that allows users to publicize short messages. Box and Twitter had market valuations of $1.48 billion 36 and $11.41 billion, 37 respectively, on March 16,
2016.
These mythical unicorns are now so common that a new type of unicorn—the “decacorn”—has come into general parlance; these are companies
with a valuation of $10 billion or more. 38 Private companies in the decacorn
category, like Airbnb, Dropbox, Pinterest, Snapchat, and Uber, are household
29
See Griffith & Primack, supra note 2. For example, Stewart Butterfield, a startup founder,
believed his startup, Slack, a business software company based in San Francisco, needed “the cachet
of the billion-dollar mark.” Id.
30
Id.
31
Not everyone is in agreement on the exact number of unicorns. The list by CB Insights is the
most current. As of March 16, 2016, there are 155 unicorns globally. See Unicorn List, supra note 1.
Notably, The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones VentureSource are also keeping a list, titled “The
Billion Dollar Startup Club,” which lists 146 unicorns globally. See Scott Austin et al., The Billion
Dollar Startup Club, WALL STREET J. (last updated Mar. 2016), http://graphics.wsj.com/billiondollar-club/ [https://perma.cc/B5UG-ZRXW].
32
But cf. Amit Karp, Betting Against Unicorns, VENTURING STARTUP NATION (June 1, 2015),
http://amitkarp.com/2015/06/01/betting-against-unicorns/?utm_source=CB+Insights+Newsletter&
utm_campaign=f9ceb3980d-Insuranceinvesting06_02_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9
dc0513989-f9ceb3980d-86759461 [https://perma.cc/WJG3-B3LX] (explaining why the high valuations for Snapchat, Dropbox, Spotify, Square, and WeWork are not justified).
33
E-mail Newsletter from Anand Sanwal, CEO & Co-Founder, CB Insights, to CB Insights blog
subscribers (July 23, 2015, 6:57 AM) (on file with author) (“Unicorns, once considered mythical and
rare, are, in reality, no longer all that special. In Q2 2015, there was a new unicorn added to the club
every 3 business days.”).
34
Unicorn List, supra note 1.
35
See id.
36
Box, Inc. Key Statistics, YAHOO! FINANCE (updated daily), http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s
=BOX+Key+Statistics [https://perma.cc/DD4V-B6HJ].
37
Twitter, Inc. Key Statistics, YAHOO! FINANCE (updated daily), http://finance.yahoo.com/q/k
s?s=twtr+Key+Statistics [https://perma.cc/THB7-9CUZ].
38
Jillian D’Onfro, There Are So Many $10 Billion Startups That There’s a New Name for Them:
‘Decacorns,’ BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/decacorn-isthe-new-unicorn-2015-3 [https://perma.cc/57G3-YK49].
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names. 39 Against the backdrop of this investing frenzy, many industry experts
predict that the current economic bubble will burst. 40 Further, some state that
the unicorns are overvalued. 41 One prominent venture capitalist, Bill Gurley, a
partner at Benchmark, observed that “[S]ilicon Valley as a whole, or . . . the
venture-capital community or startup community, is taking on an excessive
amount of risk right now—unprecedented since ’99” (the last tech bubble). 42
As it stands, only a few venture capital firms have had a high success rate with
unicorns. 43
Ironically, for all the hype around unicorns, investors who wish to participate in financings for such unicorns in the later stages of a company tend to get
lower returns:
In fact, only 27% of the investments made by VCs in [u]nicorns
have been “fund makers”—an investment that pays back the entire
value of its fund, a kind of measuring stick in the VC world. In other
words, most VCs investing in [u]nicorns are not coming away with
outsized returns. 44
B. Anatomy of a Venture Capital Deal
Where do unicorns fit in the funding universe? In order to understand
unicorns, we must look to the anatomy of a venture capital deal and key terms.
39

See id.
See Wilson, supra note 20. One such expert, Drew Nordlicht (Partner and Managing Director
of HighTower Advisors) states:
40

Private companies are staying private [longer], so the institutional community is simply
going where they can get access to larger growing companies in need of capital . . . .
The worry here is that these funds have an investor base that can redeem on any given
day, causing a liquidity drain and forced selling inside the portfolio.
Jeremy Quittner, Why Your Business Has a Unicorn Problem, INC. (May 13, 2015), http://www.inc.
com/jeremy-quittner/more-insitutional-investors-and-more-unicorns-and-the-tech-bubble-question.
html [https://perma.cc/8HN9-7AVY] (first alteration in original).
41
Cf. Lizette Chapman, ‘Unicorn’ Startups Say High Valuations Justified, Citing Big Growth
Ahead, WALL STREET J.: VENTURE CAP. DISPATCH (May 7, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
venturecapital/2015/05/07/unicorn-startups-say-high-valuations-justified-citing-big-growth-ahead/
[https://perma.cc/HRL2-K7VY].
42
Yoree Koh & Rolfe Winkler, Venture Capitalist Sounds Alarm on Startup Investing, WALL
STREET J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 3:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/venture-capitalist-sounds-alarmon-silicon-valley-risk-1410740054 [https://perma.cc/GTS9-M5NE].
43
See Which Venture Capital Firms Are Best at Spotting Unicorns Early?, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 2,
2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/billion-dollar-startup-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/
39RS-L7GK]; see also The Exceedingly Rare Unicorn VC, CB INSIGHTS (Nov. 21, 2013),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/billion-dollar-exit-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/2FA4-Q4P3]
(charting aggregate data about the number of unicorns in venture capital firms’ portfolios).
44
Chris Woodford, Investing: Unicorns Are Pretty, but Dragons Are More Desirable, WORKING
CAP. REV. (Mar. 13, 2015), http://workingcapitalreview.com/2015/03/unicorns-are-pretty-butdragons-are-more-desirable/ [https://perma.cc/NEC5-HNY8].
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Before embarking on that discussion, however, it is important to understand
what venture capital is and what it has the potential to do. 45 Venture capital is
the term commonly used to describe investments in highly speculative businesses, often early-stage technology companies. 46 Such investments are illiquid and venture capitalists may not get liquidity for their investment for years
after the investment has been made, typically when the company goes public
or is acquired. 47 At this point, the venture capital firms and others who have
invested in the company get liquidity if the company goes public or is acquired. 48 Venture capital brings not only money to a potentially disruptive, innovative company, but the expertise of the venture capital partners who typically take a board seat on the company as well.49
45

According to the NVCA,
Venture capital has enabled the United States to support its entrepreneurial talent and
appetite by turning ideas and basic science into products and services that are the envy
of the world. Venture capital funds build companies from the simplest form—perhaps
just the entrepreneur and an idea expressed as a business plan—to freestanding, mature
organizations.

NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 7.
46
See, e.g., John Greathouse, Pssst . . . Here’s How to Become a Venture Capitalist, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2012, 10:39 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20151220230430/http://www.forbes.com/
sites/johngreathouse/2012/09/18/pssst-heres-how-to-become-a-venture-capitalist/.
47
NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 7 (“This money funds new ideas that could not be financed
with traditional bank financing, that threaten established products and services in a corporation, and
that typically require five to eight years to be launched.”). The 2015 NVCA Yearbook describes venture capital as
quite unique as an institutional investor asset class. When an investment is made in a
company, it is an equity investment in a company whose stock is essentially illiquid and
worthless until a company matures five to eight years down the road. Follow-on investment provides additional funding as the company grows. These “rounds,” typically
occurring every year or two, are also equity investment, with the shares allocated
among the investors and management team based on an agreed “valuation.”
Id.

48

Id. The 2015 NVCA Yearbook further notes:
[V]enture funds generally exit their positions in [successful mature portfolio] companies by taking them public through an initial public offering (IPO) or by selling them to
presumably larger organizations (acquisition, trade sale, or increasingly a financial buyer). This then lets the venture fund distribute the proceeds to investors, raise a new fund
for future investment, and invest in the next generation of companies.

Id. at 10. Statistically speaking, “[a]lthough the investor has high hopes for any company getting
funded, only one in six ever goes public and one in three is acquired.” Id. at 7.
49
Indeed, the 2015 NVCA Yearbook notes that:
[D]aily interaction with the management team is common. This limits the number of
startups in which any one fund can invest. Few entrepreneurs approaching venture capital firms for money are aware that they essentially are asking for 1/6 of a person! Yet
that active engagement is critical to the success of the fledgling company.
Id.
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New types of documents have been generated in the venture capital deal
space, such as Series Seed financing documents 50 and Series AA financing
documents 51 by Y Combinator, which provides seed money for startups in the
amount of $120,000 in exchange for seven percent equity. 52 This Article does
not delve into the intricacies of documents in the seed stage of a venture capital financing. Instead, it provides a brief overview of Regulation D and the five
main documents that provide the framework for the later-stage venture capital
deals. This overview will help to frame the discussion and analysis included in
the subsequent Parts of this Article.
1. Regulation D
The mission of the SEC “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” 53 In the simplest terms,
when securities are offered in the United States, they must be registered with
the SEC or qualify for one of the exemptions from the registration requirements. 54 In most venture capital financings, the private companies (also known
as issuers) issuing securities rely on one of the three safe harbors of Regulation
D, an SEC regulation under the Securities Act of 1933. 55
50

Series Seed is a crowdsourced set of documents released in 2010. Version 3.2, the latest version of the Series Seed documents, includes a Term Sheet, Stock Investment Agreement (which combines what was previously the Stock Purchase Agreement and Investors’ Rights Agreement), and
Certificate of Incorporation. Version 3.2, SERIES SEED (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.seriesseed.
com/posts/2014/02/version-32.html [https://perma.cc/5EDB-6JCL]. These documents are intended for
smaller, early stage investments in the $500,000 to $1.5 million range and were “designed to keep the
most essential terms for the transaction and postpone the other terms for a later fundraising round
where such an investment would be warranted.” About the Series Seed Documents, SERIES SEED (Feb.
24, 2010), http://www.seriesseed.com/posts/2010/02/about-the-series-seed-documents.html [https://
perma.cc/Z9A9-E3WG].
51
Series AA financing documents are open-source documents available on the Y Combinator
website. Startup Documents, Y COMBINATOR, https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/#seriesaa
[https://perma.cc/R9N4-L6WP]. They include a Series AA Certificate of Incorporation, Series AA
Investors’ Rights Agreement, Series AA Stock Purchase Agreement, and board and stockholder consents. Id. They were developed in 2008 for Y Combinator-funded startups to use when raising money
with angels, with the goal of streamlining the early stage equity financing process. See id.
52
In addition to providing funding, Y Combinator also expects the founding team of the startups
that it chooses to fund the startups’ move to the Bay Area for three months and to attend weekly dinners at Y Combinator that include talks by startup experts in various fields. About Y Combinator, Y
COMBINATOR, https://www.ycombinator.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/A64H-U9Q3]. It hosts a Demo
Day ten weeks into the program, which gives the startups an opportunity to showcase their products
and services to a select audience. Id.
53
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
[https://perma.cc/RN94-EQQX].
54
See Use of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500(a) (2015).
55
See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS
LAW 175 (4th ed. 2012). Note, however, that if an issuer fails to meet the parameters of Regulation D,
it may still qualify for an exemption under section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (provided that
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One of the most important elements of Regulation D is the definition of
“accredited investor” that is set forth in Rule 501 of Regulation D. 56 Simply
put, venture capital funds that meet certain assets tests, wealthy individuals
who meet certain threshold requirements, and directors and executive officers
of companies are all deemed accredited investors.
The theory behind Regulation D is that accredited investors are financially sophisticated and therefore do not need all the protections of the securities
laws. 57 Typically, venture-backed companies rely on Rule 506(b) of Regulation
D because it permits sales of securities for more than $5 million.58 Rule 506(b)
allows offerings of any amount to an unlimited number of accredited investors
and up to thirty-five sophisticated, unaccredited investors. 59 Rule 506(c) of
Regulation D differs because it allows private securities offerings to be made
through general solicitations (through the television, newspaper, or social media), but only to accredited investors. 60 Under this new section of Rule 506,
which was promulgated under the JOBS Act, issuers must take reasonable
steps to verify that purchasers are accredited investors.61 Companies relying on
Rule 506(b) or 506(c) are subject to Rule 10b-5 anti-fraud provisions for any
persons making untrue statements, and there are “bad actor” restrictions regarding who can participate in offerings. 62 The other Regulation D safe harbors, set forth in Rules 504 and 505, are not commonly used because they set

it meets the conditions set forth therein). See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (exempting certain transactions
from registration requirements). Anecdotally, in the author’s conversations with well-known lawyers
who specialize in venture capital financings, Series A and Series B companies raising money only
from venture capitalists are increasingly relying on section 4(a)(2) and are not filing Forms D.
56
The full definition of “accredited investor” can be found at 17 C.F.R § 230.501(a) (2015).
57
See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 55, at 175. Note, however, that there are many in the
securities regulation field, such as SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, who argue that revisiting the
definition for “accredited investor” would be prudent. See Public Statement, Luis A. Aguilar,
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Revisiting the “Accredited Investor” Definition to Better Protect
Investors (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/spch121714laa.html [https://perma.cc/
C7ZJ-4VXM]. Specifically, “there is nothing in the definition that helps to identify whether these
individuals have the financial sophistication and/or investment experience to be able to assess whether
any particular investment is appropriate for them.” Id. Furthermore, because the definition of accredited investor hinges on certain income or accumulated net worth thresholds, it may be under-inclusive
because it may not include potential investors who would be viewed as financially sophisticated. See
id.
58
17 C.F.R § 230.506(b) (2015).
59
Id.
60
17 C.F.R § 230.506(c); accord Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the
Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1621
(2013) (“The reality is that with the removal of the general solicitation ban for Rule 506 offerings, this
most-used exemption is now available with no mandated disclosure, with no limits on the selling
process and without the usual incentives for due diligence found elsewhere in securities selling.”).
61
17 C.F.R § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).
62
17 C.F.R § 230.506(d).
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limitations on the dollar amount of the offerings.63 If a company sells securities
under Rules 505 or 506(b) to any purchaser that is not an accredited investor, it
must furnish the information specified under Rule 502(b)(2) at a reasonable
time prior to the sale. 64 The information required depends on the size of the
offering; in the context of unicorns, Rule 502(b)(2)(B)(3) would apply (“Offerings over $7,500,000”). 65 Therefore, unaccredited investors could expect to
receive, at a minimum, unaudited financial statements with the exception of
the balance sheet, which should be audited and dated within 120 days of the
start of the offering. Although not required, the company could also choose to
provide that same information to accredited investors.
In connection with relying on Regulation D, a Form D must be filed within fifteen calendar days of the date of first sale for each new offering of securities. 66 A Form D requires information related to the issuer’s identity, principal
place of business and contact information, related persons (executive officers,
directors, and promoters), industry group, issuer size (which the issuer can decline to disclose), federal exemption(s) and exclusion(s) claimed, type of filing, duration of offering, type(s) of securities offered, whether it is a business
transaction, whether there is a minimum investment, whether there is sales
compensation, the offering and sales amount, whether there are unaccredited
investors, the total number of investors who already have invested in the offering, sales commissions and finder’s fees expenses, and use of proceeds.67

63
Rule 504 exempts offerings of up to $1 million within a twelve-month period and imposes no
limits on the number of purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2015). Rule 505 exempts offerings up to $5
million within a twelve-month period and limits the number of unaccredited investors. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.505 (2015).
64
Although companies are not required to furnish such information to accredited investors, there
is a note in Rule 502(b)(1) that indicates that it would be advisable in light of the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2015) (“Note: When an issuer provides
information to investors pursuant to paragraph (b)(1), it should consider providing such information to
accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”).
65
See id. § 230.502(b)(2). Rule 502(b)(2)(B)(3) reads:

Offerings over $7,500,000. The financial statement as would be required in a registration statement filed under the Act on the form that the issuer would be entitled to use. If
an issuer, other than a limited partnership, cannot obtain audited financial statements
without unreasonable effort or expense, then only the issuer’s balance sheet, which
shall be dated within 120 days of the start of the offering, must be audited. If the issuer
is a limited partnership and cannot obtain the required financial statements without unreasonable effort or expense, it may furnish financial statements that have been prepared on the basis of Federal income tax requirements and examined and reported on in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by an independent public or certified accountant.
Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)(3).
66
See Form D, supra note 13, at 5.
67
Id.
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2. Term Sheet
The five main documents included in a traditional venture capital deal are
the certificate of incorporation, the stock purchase agreement, the investors’
rights agreement (which is sometimes referred to as the registration rights
agreement), the right of first refusal and co-sale agreement, and the voting
agreement. 68 These documents are standard for venture capital deals. Before
these five documents are drafted, however, both sides will agree on basic
terms, as described in a term sheet, 69 a document that sets forth a roadmap for
the terms of the deal. At the most basic level, the term sheet is about money
and control. It provides the pre- and post-money valuation 70 of the company,
the price per share for the particular series of stock, 71 the capitalization of the
company, and the specific terms of the certificate of incorporation. Although
the investors’ rights agreement and the right of first refusal and co-sale agreement are referenced in the term sheet, the certificate of incorporation, the voting agreement, and the representations and warranties section of the stock purchase agreement (and related disclosures) are usually the documents that take
the most amount of time to negotiate.
3. Certificate of Incorporation
The certificate of incorporation is a public document filed with the Secretary of State of the state in which the company is incorporated. It sets forth the
rights, preferences, privileges, and restrictions of each class and series of
stock. 72 The major provisions in the certificate of incorporation are: capitaliza-

68
Typically, when company counsel has relevant experience, company counsel will draft the deal
documents, and investors’ counsel will comment. Ancillary documents, such as the management
rights letter and company counsel’s legal opinion, are not discussed in this Article, although they are
featured on the NVCA’s website. See Model Legal Documents, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N,
http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE].
69
See, e.g., NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, TERM SHEET, http://
nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow hyperlink to “Term
Sheet”).
70
The pre-money valuation is the amount the venture capitalist determines that the company is
worth before the investment. See FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 36. It is determined by looking at a number of factors as detailed supra note 3. See also FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at
39–40. The post-money valuation is the sum of the pre-money valuation plus the amount of money the
investors intend to put into the company. See FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 39–40.
71
The price per share is calculated by dividing the pre-money valuation by the fully-diluted number of shares. A fully-diluted basis is “a methodology for calculating any per share ratios whereby the
denominator is the total number of shares issued by the company on the assumption that all warrants
and options are exercised and preferred stock.” See NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 99.
72
See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow
hyperlink to “Certificate of Incorporation”) [hereinafter MODEL COI].
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tion, 73 dividends, 74 liquidation preference, 75 conversion, 76 antidilution protection, 77 redemption, 78 voting, 79 protective provisions, 80 and pay-to-play. 81
73
Capitalization sets forth the number of shares of preferred stock and common stock. The common stock number should take into account the preferred stock on an as-converted to common basis as
well as the stock option pool. See id. at 3–4.
74
Dividends can provide additional time-based guaranteed upside to investors, but typically in
financings on the West Coast, dividends are not “cumulative,” meaning they are paid only if declared
by the company’s board of directors, and therefore have no meaningful value. Cumulative dividends
were used in less than 10% of West Coast deals; in contrast, according to information from various
law firm surveys, cumulative dividends were used in 30–50% of their East Coast deals. Dana M. Warren, Venture Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 19
(2012); WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S REPORT: PRIVATE COMPANY
FINANCING TRENDS, FULL-YEAR 2015, https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/entreport/
Q42015/private-company-financing-trends.htm#top [https://perma.cc/PU85-MSPV] (noting that cumulative dividends were used in 12%, 13%, and 3% of its private company financings (all rounds) in
2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively, but not differentiating between East Coast and West Coast financings).
75
Liquidation preference “impacts how the proceeds are shared in a liquidity event, which is
usually defined as a sale of the company or the majority of the company’s assets.” FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 41. There are two components to it: the preference and participation. Id. For
example, terms may indicate that holders of a particular series of preferred stock “shall be entitled to
receive in preference to the holders of the Common Stock a per share amount equal to [X] times the
Original Purchase Price plus any declared but unpaid dividends.” Id. There are three types of participation: no participation (holders of preferred stock receive their money back first and receive nothing
thereafter unless they choose to convert their stock to common stock), capped participation (holders of
preferred stock receive their money back first and then share ratably with the holders of common
stock up to a total liquidation amount per share equal to some multiple of the original purchase price),
and full participation (holders of preferred stock receive their money back first and then share ratably
with the holders of common stock with no cap). See id. at 42.
76
Conversion includes the investors’ right to convert preferred stock to common stock as well as
the automatic conversion of preferred stock to common stock in the event of a firm commitment,
underwritten initial public offering, or by a written request for such conversion from a certain percentage—such as a majority—of the preferred stock then outstanding. See MODEL COI, supra note 72, at
16.
77
The antidilution provision is included “to protect investors in the event a company issues equity
at a lower valuation than in previous financing rounds.” FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 56.
There are weighted average antidilution provisions (both broad- and narrow-based) and ratchet-based
antidilution provisions. See id. at 56–57 (providing a detailed description of how antidilution works).
78
Redemption is rarely invoked and is thought of as more of an East Coast term. See MODEL
COI, supra note 72, at 33 n.60.
79
Unless specified in the certificate of incorporation, both the preferred stock and common stock
vote as one class upon certain transactions. For example, under Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”), a class vote is not required in certain transactions, such as mergers, reorganizations, or
distributions upon dissolution. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West, Westlaw through 80
Laws 2016, ch. 202) (“Merger or consolidation of domestic corporations”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 275 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016, ch. 202) (“Dissolutions generally; procedure”). Under
the DGCL, there can be class voting for the election of directors.
80
Protective provisions are analogous to veto rights; investors can veto certain actions by the
company. See MODEL COI, supra note 72, at 13–16.
81
A “pay-to-play” provision requires investors to participate in future financings to maintain their
pro rata share in order to avoid pre-negotiating penalties, such as the forced conversion of their preferred stock to common stock. See id. at i.

Boston College Law Review

596

[Vol. 57:583

4. Stock Purchase Agreement
The stock purchase agreement provides for the purchase, sale, and closing
of the venture capital financing. Specifically, it sets forth the price per share for
the series of preferred stock being offered and the number of shares of preferred stock authorized for issuance in the offering. 82 It also includes the mechanics of the purchase of preferred stock—the closing date 83 and conditions
to closing. There are also representations and warranties that the company
makes to investors and vice-versa. 84 Sometimes founders may be asked to
make representations and warranties as well, although this is much less common in venture capital financings generally.85 Purchasers of the preferred stock
are also asked to make a limited set of representations; this is primarily to establish that they are eligible to participate in the offering and qualify for exemptions under applicable state and federal securities law. In addition, there
are covenants of the company and miscellaneous terms, such as amendment
and waiver, payment of investors’ counsel, 86 and a conflict waiver.
5. Investors’ Rights Agreement
The investors’ rights agreement governs the rights of the major investors
as to how and when they can cause the company to register shares of common
stock issuable to the investors. It also sets forth major investors’ access to cer82

See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, STOCK PURCHASE
AGREEMENT, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow
hyperlink to “Stock Purchase Agreement”) [hereinafter MODEL SPA] (discussing standard provisions in
a stock purchase agreement).
83
A stock purchase agreement can be drafted to allow for multiple closings.
84
The representations and warranties made by the company can be hotly negotiated:
The purpose of the Company’s representations is primarily to create a mechanism to
ensure full disclosure about the Company’s organization, financial condition and business to the investors. The Company is required to list any deviations from the representations on a Disclosure Schedule, the preparation and review of which drives the due
diligence process on both sides of the deal.
MODEL SPA, supra note 82, at 5 n.14.
85
Founders’ representations are not often seen:
[These representations] are more likely to appear if Founders are receiving liquidity
from the transaction, or if there is heightened concern over intellectual property (e.g.,
the Company is a spin-out from an academic institution or the Founder was formerly
with another company whose business could be deemed competitive with the Company), or in international deals. Founders’ representations are even less common in subsequent rounds, where risk is viewed as significantly diminished and fairly shared by the
investors, rather than being disproportionately borne by the Founders.
Id. at 22 n.44.
86
It is customary for the company to pay investors’ legal fees, which is typically capped at
$25,000 to $40,000 for early stage financings. See FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 12.
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tain information from the company, and their ability to participate in future
equity offerings. Therefore, a fairly standard investors’ rights agreement will
include registration rights,87 information rights, 88 board observation rights, 89
right to future stock issuances, 90 and post-closing covenants. 91
6. Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement
The purpose of the right of first refusal and co-sale agreement is to keep a
company’s capital stock within the group of existing stockholders, thereby
preventing transfer of control to competitors, non-strategic parties, and the
like. 92 In the event that a “Key Holder” wants to transfer its holdings, it must
first offer the company the right to purchase such shares and then offer that
right to a defined group of investors (typically the major investors). 93 Only
after the company and investors refuse to purchase the shares may the Key
Holder proceed to sell its shares to the proposed transferee, and in that event,
other investors are allowed to participate in the sale on a pro rata basis based
on their holdings in the company. 94 Essentially, the right of first refusal and cosale agreement is intended to restrict the transfer of shares by Key Holders
with certain limited exceptions. 95

87
There are three types of registration rights: demand (investor demands that the private company
file a registration statement), piggyback (investors “piggyback” on the company’s intention to register
its securities), and Form S-3 (short-form registration). See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL
LEGAL DOCUMENTS, INVESTOR RIGHTS AGREEMENT 5–8 & n.7, http://nvca.org/resources/modellegal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow hyperlink to “Investor Rights Agreement”)
[hereinafter MODEL IRA].
88
See infra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (discussing provisions in the NVCA’s Model
Investors’ Rights Agreement).
89
See infra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (discussing provisions in the NVCA’s Model
Investors’ Rights Agreement).
90
A right of first offer is the investors’ right to participate in future issuances of stock (which
differs from the right of first refusal under a right of first refusal and co-sale agreement). Under the
terms of the right of first offer, the company must first offer each Major Holder (as that term is defined in the document) an opportunity to maintain their pro rata interest in the company in the next
round of financing. See MODEL IRA, supra note 87, at 24–27.
91
Post-closing covenants can range from purchasing insurance to fixing a problem post-closing
that was discovered during the diligence process.
92
See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, RIGHT OF FIRST
REFUSAL AND CO-SALE AGREEMENT, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://
perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow hyperlink to “Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement”) [hereinafter MODEL ROFR & CO-SALE AGREEMENT] (providing standard provisions in a Right of First
Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement).
93
“Key Holders” are typically defined as the stockholders (including founders and key employees) who hold a sizable chunk of the company’s common stock.
94
See MODEL ROFR & CO-SALE AGREEMENT, supra note 92, at 6.
95
See id. at 9–11.
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7. Voting Agreement
The voting agreement contractually obligates the founders (i.e., major
stockholders) and investors to vote their shares in board elections in favor of
particular individuals. 96 By doing so, the composition of the board is ensured.
If negotiated by investors and agreed upon in the term sheet, drag-along
rights 97 may also be included in the voting agreement.
II. THE CASE FOR INCREASED DISCLOSURE FOR UNICORNS
Part I provides background on unicorns as unique economic creatures that
have become the new normal in venture capital financings. In light of this
characterization, Part II argues that the current regulatory framework is not
sufficient for the new reality of unicorns. Presently, the only documents available to the public are the companies’ Form D filings 98 and restated certificates
of incorporation. 99 According to Professor Louis Loss of Harvard Law School
and Joel Seligman, President of the University of Rochester, “[T]here is the
recurrent theme throughout [the federal securities laws] of disclosure, again
disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits. But
‘the truth shall make you free.’” 100 The idea is that under a disclosure-based
regime, the full and fair disclosure of pertinent information regarding the securities being marketed will adequately protect investors 101 by “provid[ing] investors with sufficient opportunity to evaluate the merits of an investment and

96

This agreement must work in tandem with the certificate of incorporation. The voting agreement ensures that the designee of a particular preferred holder—typically the lead investor in a
round—will have a particular “seat” on the board. Note, however, that the fact that a particular director was elected by certain holders of a particular class or series of stock does not negate that individual’s fiduciary duties to all stockholders of the company. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., Nos. 7075 & 7079,
1988 WL 124325, at *743 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1988) (“The defendants correctly argue that the directors’ fiduciary duty runs to the corporation and to the entire body of shareholders generally, as opposed to specific shareholders or shareholder subgroups.”), aff’d, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990).
97
Drag-along rights contractually obligate minority stockholders to vote their shares in favor of a
sale of the company, thereby preventing an attempt to block any such sale. In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, a 2013 Delaware Chancery Court decision, may bolster the case to include dragalong rights, as the court suggested in dicta that limiting the board’s exposure to fiduciary claims may
be possible by using drag-along provisions. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 56–57
n.32 (Del. Ch. 2013).
98
Form D filings are publicly available without cost through the SEC’s website. See EDGAR:
Search Tools, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm [https://
perma.cc/633N-AKVS].
99
A copy of a private company’s certificate of incorporation may be purchased from the secretary
of state of the state where the company was incorporated. See, e.g., Certification Memo, STATE OF
DEL. DIV. OF CORP., http://corp.delaware.gov/certmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB4J-UET3].
100
1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 45 (3d ed. revised 1998).
101
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12.
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fend for themselves.” 102 As Justice Brandeis noted on this matter, “Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .” 103
Uber (which is more fully discussed in Part III) is one example of a unicorn with an outsized impact. Its reach is vast—the company currently operates in six continents, 104 forty-five countries, 105 and 300 cities.106 According to
reports, it “services millions of customers and employs hundreds of thousands
of drivers.” 107 The number of drivers for this five-year-old company has increased dramatically to meet consumer demand. Recently, the Chief Executive
Officer (“CEO”) of Uber reported that the company had “26,000 drivers in
New York City alone; 15,000 in London; 22,000 in San Francisco; 10,000 in
Paris; and 20,000 in Chengdu, China.” 108 Uber has over 3000 employees
worldwide 109 and is expected to reach $10 billion in gross revenue at the end
of 2015. 110 Because Uber nets twenty percent of every transaction, this
amounts to $2 billion in net revenue for the company. 111 Despite these staggering numbers, little is known about Uber except what the company chooses to
report to the media. Uber’s impact on local economies becomes even more
apparent when looking at a particular market, such as Chicago. 112 In Chicago

102

Id. at 12. A disclosure-based regime also means that the SEC does not need to engage in the
much more time-consuming evaluation of the merits of the securities. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by
the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
417, 418 (2003).
103
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
104
Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a Contractor,
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-californialabor-ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PWU6-3MLT].
105
Alyson Shontell, Uber Is Generating a Staggering Amount of Revenue, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.
15, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-projection-in-2015-2014-11
[https://perma.cc/XUM5-7HER].
106
Isaac & Singer, supra note 104. But see infra notes 293–300 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of evaluating unicorns’ revenue and operations).
107
Alison Griswold, In Search of Uber’s Unicorn, SLATE (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:29 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/10/uber_driver_salary_the_ride_sharing_company
_says_its_drivers_make_great.1.html [https://perma.cc/2M2S-BUU2]; see infra notes 286–321 and
accompanying text (providing different numbers for Uber).
108
Isaac & Singer, supra note 104. In contrast, there are approximately 13,000 yellow cabs in
New York City. Matt Flegenheimer & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in Struggle
Over New York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/nyregion/
city-hall-and-uber-clash-in-struggle-over-new-york-streets.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7D3N-5ARC].
109
Maya Kosoff & Nathan McAlone, Where Are They Now: Meet 12 of Uber’s First Employees—Three of Them Are Now Billionaires, BUS. INSIDER (June 4, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/ubers-first-employees-2015-6?op=1 [https://perma.cc/R2DE-3YEU].
110
Shontell, supra note 105.
111
See id.
112
See Andrew MacDonald, UberDATA: Uber’s Economic Impact on the City of Chicago, UBER
NEWSROOM (Mar. 12, 2014), http://newsroom.uber.com/chicago/2014/03/uberdata-ubers-economicimpact-on-the-city-of-chicago/ [https://perma.cc/SJS8-GMHB].
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in 2013, Uber had 25,000 rides, was associated with 1049 new jobs, and had a
total gross impact of over $46 million on the city’s economy. 113
Unicorns like Uber also demonstrate the inadequacy of other regulatory
frameworks outside the securities realm. Recently, the California Labor Commissioner’s Office ruled that an Uber driver was an employee and not an independent contractor, as Uber claims. 114 If Uber’s appeal is unsuccessful, this
would mean increased revenue for social security, healthcare, and other benefits for Uber drivers in California, and the unresolved question of whether Uber drivers should be classified as employees or independent contractors could
have implications for Uber drivers in other states. 115 It also leads to larger policy questions regarding how different worker classifications affect low-wage
workers, not only among unicorns.
A study done by Arun Sundararajan of New York University Stern School
of Business and research scientist Samuel Fraiberger analyzed two years of
data from a car-share company, Getaround, and found that
peer-to-peer markets improve consumer welfare. These increases in
surplus grow consistently with the fraction of the population who
have access to the marketplace, and with the level of marketplace liquidity, or the fraction of supply and demand requests that are fulfilled. Predicted consumer surplus gains in the automobile industry
are substantial, ranging from 0.8% to 6.6%, which corresponds to
billions of dollars of value creation. 116
Additionally, below-median-income consumers have a higher demand for
Uber-type services than above-median-income consumers, which suggests
“fairly dramatic shifts away from automobile ownership as the popularity and
efficiency of such marketplaces grows.” 117 In short, Uber is changing the
transportation behavior of below-median-income consumers.
Airbnb is another example of a unicorn’s effect on local economies and
highlights the need for increased disclosure. In 2010, Airbnb booked 100,000

113

See id.
See Isaac & Singer, supra note 104.
115
See id. In addition to their outsized impact on economies, unicorns may upend social and cultural norms. See Jonathan V. Hall & Allan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s
Driver-Partners in the United States 3 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No.
587, 2015), http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp010z708z67d [https://perma.cc/C9FD-7B58]
(analyzing the impact Uber has on the changing notions of work with respect to hours, flexibility, and
participants in the sharing economy).
116
Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundarajan, Peer-to-Peer Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy
4 (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus. Research Paper, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574337 [https://
perma.cc/927J-9PTY].
117
Id. at 27.
114
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nights in the month of January; 118 that number has skyrocketed to over 500,000
guests per night in May 2015, 119 “making them comparable in inventory and
transaction volume to the world’s largest hotel brands.” 120 According to a Barclays research report, “Airbnb offers more rooms than many of the largest hotel groups in the world—Hilton, InterContinental and Marriott—which each
maintain just under 700,000 rooms.” 121 The report further states that “Airbnb
currently represents as much as 17.2% of hotel room supply in New York,
11.9% in Paris, and 10.4% in London . . . and those percentages are projected
to increase.” 122 In fact, it may triple its number of bookings and have 129 million room-nights available per year by the end of 2016; at this rate, Airbnb
could outpace the largest hotel companies in just a few years. 123
It would be unthinkable to have little to no information on a large hotel
chain like Hyatt (which Airbnb has surpassed in valuation),124 but that is exactly the predicament we find ourselves in with Airbnb because disclosure mechanisms have not been recalibrated to address the veil of secrecy that currently
exists. Between 2012 and 2013, 400,000 Airbnb guests visited New York City
and “spent $632 million, supporting 4,580 jobs.” 125 Although most hotels in
New York are located in midtown Manhattan, eighty-two percent of Airbnb’s
accommodations were located across other parts of New York City, thereby
dispersing the economic benefits across the city. 126
Despite its successes, however, Airbnb must address the question of how
certain laws, such as housing and taxation, apply to them. 127 In another exam118
M.G. Siegler, Airbnb Tucked in Nearly 800% Growth in 2010; Caps off the Year with a Slick
Video, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 6, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/06/airbnb-2010/ [https://perma.
cc/LX8L-K84B].
119
Alexia Tsotsis, Airbnb Hopes to Have Almost a Million Stays a Night by Summer,
TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/27/airbnb-hopes-to-have-almost-amillion-stays-a-night-by-summer/ [https://perma.cc/HYE3-S87T]. The company expects this number
to reach 800,000 in the summer of 2015. Id.
120
Fraiberger & Sundarajan, supra note 116, at 2–3.
121
Zainab Mudallal, Airbnb Will Soon Be Booking More Rooms Than the World’s Largest Hotel
Chains, QUARTZ (Jan. 20, 2015), http://qz.com/329735/airbnb-will-soon-be-booking-more-roomsthan-the-worlds-largest-hotel-chains/ [https://perma.cc/W5LA-H5RQ]. Unlike its hotel counterparts,
however, Airbnb does not own its rooms and the rooms are not available year-round. See id.
122
Id.
123
See id.
124
Ankit Ajmera, Airbnb Valued at $13 Billion as It Discusses Employee Stock Sale—WSJ, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014, 9:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/airbnb-financing-idUSL
3N0SI7M120141024 [https://perma.cc/RZM7-2WMT].
125
Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation and
Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 104–05 (2015).
126
See id. at 105.
127
See id. at 109; see also Zak Stone, Living and Dying on Airbnb, MATTER (Nov. 8, 2015),
https://medium.com/matter/living-and-dying-on-airbnb-6bff8d600c04 [https://perma.cc/KA8K-SEWH]
(“Staying with a stranger or inviting one into your home is an inherently dicey proposition. Hotel
rooms are standardized for safety, monitored by staff, and often quite expensive. Airbnb rentals, on
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ple, between June 2011 and May 2012, Airbnb generated $56 million in economic activity in San Francisco and supported 430 jobs.128 On average, Airbnb
guests stayed longer than they would in a hotel (and spent more because of the
money they saved on accommodations). 129 They also visited more neighborhoods compared to hotel guests (6.2 out of 18 neighborhoods for Airbnb guests
and 4.2 for hotel guests). 130 Airbnb did not affect hotel occupancy rates adversely, either. 131 Therefore, the businesses supplying accommodations benefitted overall. As a point of contrast, a Boston University study on Airbnb and
its impact on the Texas hotel industry found that Airbnb had a slight impact on
lower-priced hotels and those hotels not focused on business travelers. 132 The
affected hotels, however, decreased prices, benefiting all consumers. 133 In the
end, Airbnb users enjoy decreased prices and increased variety in types of accommodations, and Airbnb hosts have the opportunity to earn extra income.134
Unicorns can spur economic development in another way, as well; their
sheer size and demand for the services they provide create a need for infrastructure and services that assist these companies, influencing the growth of
businesses in other industries. For example, there is a growing cadre of
startups in the on-demand infrastructure and services space that help to provide
background checks, route and vehicle optimization, logistics, and the like for
unicorns such as Uber and Airbnb. 135

the other hand, are unregulated, eclectic, and affordable, and the safety standards are only slowly
materializing.”). Even when regulations are proposed, they may be defeated given the deep pockets of
Airbnb. For example, Proposition F in San Francisco, which would have put a limit on the number of
nights a host would be allowed to rent out his or her property and imposed fines of up to $1000 per
night for violations, was defeated. Elizabeth Weise, San Francisco to Vote on Measure to Allow
Neighbors to Sue Over Airbnb, USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/2015/10/29/san-francisco-airbnb-proposition-f-regulation-sharing-economy-rentals-shortterm/74631024/ [https://perma.cc/N476-ZQAR]; see also Mollie Reilly, San Francisco Votes Down
Tough Airbnb Regulations, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2015, 1:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/airbnb-san-francisco-vote_us_5637d49ae4b027f9b969ac7c [https://perma.cc/T92G-U5NF].
Airbnb spent over $8 million on this effort. See Reilly, supra.
128
HR&A ADVISORS, INC., AIRBNB ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND ITS NEIGHBORHOODS, FINDINGS REPORT PREVIEW 35 (2012), http://www.deperslijst.com/persbericht/econ_
impact_Final_Report_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F6V-FQD5].
129
Id. at 34.
130
Id. at 41.
131
Id. at 43.
132
Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on
the Hotel Industry 22–25 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2366898 [https://perma.cc/KTD6-3HGN].
133
See id. at 27.
134
Id.
135
See Pickaxes and Shovels: 35 Startups Providing Infrastructure for the On-Demand Boom,
CB INSIGHTS (July 14, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/infrastructure-for-on-demandstartups/ [https://perma.cc/67UR-95QC].
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Recent media coverage also highlights the extent to which employees
have been harmed when unicorns fail to be transparent. 136 One has to look no
further than what happened when Good Technology was acquired by Blackberry in late 2015—many employees felt blindsided when they found that their
shares were worthless. 137 In the recent IPO of Square, the company was valued
at less than its valuation as a private company; this was arguably not the
hoped-for outcome. 138 Investors were protected due to the ratchet they had negotiated during the last round of equity financing; the ratchet “guaranteed a 20
percent premium on their investment . . . meaning Square had to issue more
shares to those investors, further devaluing the stock owned by employees.”139
One journalist has observed:
Today’s information scarcity means each new shred of bad news
makes us rightly wonder which other startups are hiding dysfunction. The lack of transparency is a problem for startup investors, and
it’s a problem for the companies doing business with startups. But
it’s really a problem for startup employees. They often don’t know
much more than we do about the health of the companies they work
136
Sarah Frier & Adam Satariano, Big IPO, Tiny Payout for Many Startup Workers, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Dec. 22, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-17/big-ipo-tinypayout-for-many-startup-workers [https://perma.cc/3TSX-R2C4]. One report explains, “Many executives, early investors, and even later investors are able to cash out before the rank and file, or bargain
for guarantees that help ensure a bonanza . . . . Ordinary employees are typically without meaningful
financial protections or even a clear sense of what their equity stakes mean . . . .” Id.; see also Sarah
Frier & Adam Satariano, Square Employees Find Some of Their Stock Options Under Water, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 19, 2015, 4:44 PM) [hereinafter Square Employees], http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-11-19/square-employees-find-some-of-their-stock-options-under-water?utm_cam
paign=sniply&utm_medium=sniply&utm_source=sniply [https://perma.cc/3YSH-SV3Z] (discussing
the Square IPO and how Square’s employees did not get the windfall they expected).
137
Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-up Stumbles, Its Employees Get Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-unicorn-start-up-stumbles-itsemployees-get-hurt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/38FT-FTV2] (giving examples of how employees
were unaware of the true financial situation of their company and were affected by taxes levied by the
Internal Revenue Service when their shares were considered valuable assets). As one reporter stated,

What Good [Technology]’s employees experienced is an example of who loses out
when a company backed by venture capital goes south. While plenty of people—
including founders, top executives and investors—are involved in the rise of a start-up,
those hit the hardest during a company’s fall are the rank-and-file employees.
Id. Good Technology common stock was worth $0.44 (or 10% of what it was worth the prior year); the
preferred stock was worth seven times as much in the acquisition. Paul Sawers, After Good Technology’s
$425M Fire Sale to BlackBerry, a Shareholder Offers His Windfall to Colleagues Who Lost Out, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 11, 2016, 5:55 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2016/01/11/after-good-technologys-425mfire-sale-to-blackberry-an-entrepreneur-offers-his-windfall-to-colleagues-who-lost-out/ [https://perma.
cc/HH7J-BH9V].
138
See Square Employees, supra note 136.
139
Id. (noting that late stage investors require “ratchets” which essentially gives these investors
more downside protection if the company performs poorly).
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for. Or worse, their CEOs sell them on the gospel of “crushing it”
even as the wheels fall off. 140
In the midst of the unicorn craze, some mutual funds, such as Fidelity,
marked down their investments in well-known startups (that also happen to be
unicorns); the list included Dropbox, Snapchat, and Zenefits, among others.141
This was an unwelcome surprise to the companies and venture capitalists that
were accustomed to controlling the narrative regarding such companies. 142 In
response, venture capitalists said that
stamping a value every quarter on a company such as Snapchat,
which still periodically reinvents its business model, doesn’t make
sense. Two backers of the recently devalued companies . . . say
startups may now be more reluctant to take money from mutual fund
companies. [Matt] McIlwain [of Madrona Venture Group] blames
them for driving up valuations in the first place by overpaying for
access to hot deals. 143
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, the current disclosure regime is
woefully inadequate. Much of the information provided above came after
many hours of sifting through numerous sources. Put simply, unicorns are too
big to regulate under the current regulatory framework. Companies that have
reached unicorn status are so big and their impact on investors, employees, and
local economies so broad that they merit new disclosure requirements based on
market valuation. Under the current securities regulation regime, these companies are not subject to any minimum disclosure requirements, and in the aggre-

140
Erin Griffith, Private Startups “Crush It.” Public Companies Get Crushed, FORTUNE (Feb. 6,
2016, 11:36 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/05/startup-ipo-uber/ [https://perma.cc/8F8B-B9HH]
(noting that some startups, such as Pinterest, are being more transparent).
141
Dan Primack, Why Fidelity’s Markdowns Could Rock the Startup and VC Worlds, FORTUNE
(Nov. 13, 2015, 2:14 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/11/13/why-fidelitys-markdowns-could-rock-thestartup-and-vc-worlds/ [https://perma.cc/W5PP-SGWB]. Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, and The Hartford
are among those mutual fund managers that have marked down the stock of their private investments.
Dan Primack, Beyond Fidelity: Even More Mutual Fund Markdowns of Tech Startups, FORTUNE
(Nov. 17, 2015, 4:53 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/11/17/mutual-fund-markdowns-startups/ [https://
perma.cc/T5SH-VMBC].
142
Sarah Frier & Dina Bass, Silicon Valley’s Hottest Startups Get a Taste of Going Public Without the IPO, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 18, 2015, 1:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-11-18/silicon-valley-s-hottest-startups-get-an-unexpected-taste-of-going-public-withoutthe-ipo [https://perma.cc/2FTT-JJDH].
143
Id. Max Wolff, Chief Economist at Manhattan Venture Partners, stated: “It’s become de
rigueur for companies to double in value because 12 months have passed and they found new investors. If that doesn’t trip your alarm bells, then your alarm bells have failed . . . . The companies are
overvalued. They shouldn’t kill the messenger.” Id.
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gate they are employing thousands of people and are valued at almost half a
trillion dollars.144
Such obligations will create some amount of operational burden on these
companies, but in balancing the importance of disclosure for stockholders,
employees, and other parties, disclosure is warranted; especially because unicorns are raising hundreds of millions of dollars—more than some companies
raise when they go public. Enhanced disclosure can take several forms: (1)
providing more information on the Form D; (2) making the restated certificates
of incorporation more easily attainable; (3) having a plain English version of
the key terms of the certificate of incorporation available; and (4) providing
periodic financial information similar to what companies would need to provide for unaccredited investors in a private placement.
A. The Current State of Affairs
Under section 3 of the National Venture Capital Association’s (“NVCA”)
Model Investors’ Rights Agreement, a company is required to provide major
investors with year-end, quarterly, and monthly financial statements,145 as well
as budgets and business plans. There may also be a “catch-all” provision that
provides that major investors may request information “relating to the financial
condition, business, prospects, or corporate affairs of the Company.” 146 It is
important to note that only those falling under the definition of “major investors” are entitled to such information rights. This definition is based on ownership of a threshold amount of preferred stock on an as-converted to common
stock basis that would be high enough to include even a venture capital firm
with minimal holdings, without subjecting the company to onerous disclosure

144
As of March 16, 2016, the total valuation is $550 billion. See Unicorn List, supra note 1; cf.
William D. Cohan, Good Luck Getting Out!, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 2016, at 56 (listing 173 unicorns worth
$585 billion).
145
See MODEL IRA, supra note 87, at 20. For year-end financial statements, this may include
audited balance sheets, statements of income and cash flows, and statements of stockholders’ equity.
For quarterly and monthly financial statements, it would include unaudited balance sheets, statements
of income and cash flows, and possibly statements of stockholders’ equity.
146
Id. at 22. As observed in a footnote to the Investors’ Rights Agreement’s “Information and
Observer Rights” section,

Some investors request that the Company provide information relating to material litigation, regulatory matters, material defaults under credit facilities, and other material
events and occurrences. Note, however, that if the investing entity is entitled to a Board
seat, there is little need (at least for that particular investor) to impose these additional
reporting obligations on the Company.
Id. at 22 n.34. The theory behind this idea is that, as a board member, the investor would already have
access to this type of information because these topics would undoubtedly be discussed in board meetings.
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requirements. 147 Unsurprisingly, the contractual definition of the type of information required for major investors is much broader than what is required
under the securities laws. 148 This stems from the notion that venture capitalists
are not passive investors, but instead play active roles in developing the company. Some investors may even negotiate board observer rights, allowing them
to sit in on board meetings in a nonvoting capacity and entitling them to more
information, such as notices, minutes, consents, and other materials that a
company provides to its directors. 149
Although unicorns will include these standard provisions regarding information rights and board observer rights for the benefit of their major investors, greater transparency is warranted for all stockholders. In the case of a
public company, any individual can obtain detailed information about the
company, including financial statements, on the SEC’s website.150 Public companies are required to file quarterly (Form 10-Q) 151 and annual (Form 10-K)152
reports with the SEC. If material events occur in between regular reports, a
public company must report such events on a Form 8-K. 153 Unicorns are not
subject to these requirements, with most information about such companies
therefore remaining undisclosed. Even well-known venture capitalists are voicing their concerns about this lack of disclosure. Ben Horowitz of Andreessen
Horowitz, one of the top-tier venture capital firms, described the late-stage
market as “completely unregulated” and called the limited nature of disclosure
by high-valuation private companies “scary.” 154 Another venture capitalist,
Josh Burwick, managing partner at Sand Hill East Ventures, wrote:
147

Id. at 20 n.31 (“The share-ownership minimum for receiving financial information is negotiable, but is often set at the holdings of the smallest venture capital investor. It should be set high
enough to avoid burdensome disclosure requirements on the Company, but low enough to provide
investors with information if they really need it.”).
148
See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
149
Of course, the right to observe is tempered by certain restrictions. For example, the company
can withhold information or exclude an observer from portions of meetings to the extent that his or
her presence would adversely affect attorney-client privilege between the company and its counsel or
lead to the disclosure of trade secrets or a conflict of interest, or if the board observer is a competitor
to the company. The parameters of board observer rights would be set forth in an investors’ rights
agreement. See, e.g., MODEL IRA, supra note 87, at 22–23 (discussing disclosure).
150
See EDGAR: Search Tools, supra note 98.
151
See Form 10-Q, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-q.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SEF-EVHA].
152
See Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V9Z6-TY3Z].
153
See Form 8-K, Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J534-V28R].
154
Maureen Farrell, Slack’s Story Justifies Sky-High Tech Valuations, Ben Horowitz Says, WALL
STREET J.: MONEY BEAT (Apr. 29, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/29/
slacks-story-justifies-sky-high-tech-valuations-ben-horowitz-says/ [https://perma.cc/U38J-NW2B].
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Public companies are being held to a higher standard than their private company peers, which has always been the case, but now that
valuations are comparable it no longer makes sense. It’s as if the
private companies have “tested out” of the due diligence of their
peers and are being held to an honor system to divulge metrics as
they see fit. 155
There are those in the legal academy who argue that increased disclosure,
in and of itself, is not sufficient in the complex world in which we live. 156 On
the other end of the spectrum, too much disclosure can cause information overload. 157 Scholars have offered a number of strategies to address some of the
disclosure issues, such as a consumer-protection approach that focuses on the
behavioral implications of disclosure. 158 Others propose a tiered system of dis155

Josh Burwick, Should Private Cos. with Large Valuations Have to Disclose Metrics?, PITCHBOOK DATA, INC. (May 12, 2015), http://blog.pitchbook.com/should-private-cos-with-large-valuationshave-to-disclose-metrics/ [https://perma.cc/MUY4-YCMX].
156
Steven Schwarcz argues that, “[F]ull disclosure of structured transactions does not, as a practical matter, provide investors in the originator’s securities with sufficient opportunity to evaluate the
merits of an investment. Moreover, most investors do not have the ability to evaluate structured transactions.” Schwarcz, supra note 101, at 12. Similarly, Steven Davidoff and Claire Hill assert that
disclosure is too often a convenient path for policymakers and many others looking to
take action and hold onto comforting beliefs in the face of a bad outcome. Disclosure’s
limits reveal yet again the need for a better understanding of the relationship between
information processing and decisionmaking and more broadly, for a more nuanced view
of human nature that can better inform policy decisions.
Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 604 (2013);
see also Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 421,
423 (2012) (“[D]isclosure about securities and transactions in securities must relate not to the nature
of the securities, but to the reliability of the intermediaries and the innovators that produce these securities—whoever produces them.”); Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the
Limits of Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (using principles of behavioral psychology to
argue that disclosure is inadequate as a default remedy).
157
Troy Paredes argues:
Two things are needed for the federal securities laws, or any disclosure-based regulatory regime, to be effective. The first is straightforward: information has to be disclosed.
The second is equally straightforward, but often overlooked. That is, the users of the information—for example, investors, securities analysts, brokers, and money managers—
need to use the disclosed information effectively.
Paredes, supra note 102, at 418. Paredes further notes that information overload can negatively impact
decisionmaking. See id. at 419.
158
Henry Hu examines depictions of the risk-return characteristics of asset-backed securities and
proposes “a disclosure paradigm that relies on both the intermediary depiction model [the model used
by the SEC, in which corporations act as an ‘intermediary’ in transmitting a depiction of the objective
reality to investors] and the pure information model [in which investors directly access the objective
reality].” Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1610 (2012); see also Joseph A. Franco, A Consumer
Protection Approach to Mutual Fund Disclosure and the Limits of Simplification, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 1, 9 (2009) (“A consumer-protection orientation to disclosure, by emphasizing the behavioral
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closure for companies. 159 There are also scholars who propose fixes to the information asymmetry in the disclosure regime. 160 The present proposal of enhanced disclosure for the unicorn dilemma, detailed below, does not claim to
be a panacea. Rather, it is a starting point for a larger discussion about the type
and quality of information that should be disclosed, the presentation of that
disclosure, and the manner in which it is disclosed.
B. Recommended Disclosures for Unicorns
This Article now turns to the question of what type of metrics unicorns
should divulge. There are good reasons for a private company to remain in
stealth mode, such as the need to develop new products that will revolutionize
the particular ways we have done things (e.g., Uber’s disruption of the taxi
industry) before bringing the product to market. At the point where valuations
of private companies are as large or larger than most public companies, however, the company has already amassed a great deal of capital and is essentially
not regulated by anyone, save for its major investors and its board. In fact, in
many cases, the founders of the company exercise significant control.161
As this Article points out in Part I above, the terms of private investments—which may inflate the reported valuations of unicorns—are often undisclosed. 162 Unfortunately, unlike the major investors, both stockholders and
implications of disclosure, provides definite and concrete policy guidance in the design of mutual fund
disclosure that differs from the SEC’s prospectus-centric approach.”).
159
See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the
Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 156 (2013) (arguing for
three categories of federal periodic disclosure requirements); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert
B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO.
L.J. 337, 342 (2013) (suggesting a two-tier system for disclosure obligations under contemporary
securities regulation to “ease the costs associated with transition from private to public company”: one
for smaller companies and the other “reserved for companies with a larger societal footprint”). But cf.
Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 533 (2012) (arguing for a
“lifecycle” approach in regulating the secondary markets).
160
See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179,
182–83 (2012) (examining various information issues in the context of secondary markets and suggesting minimum information requirements as well as looking at accredited investor status from a
threshold perspective); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Laws’ Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3389, 3427–34 (2013) (looking at the secondary markets and contrasting the access of wealthy investors versus the “little guy” in such markets, and proposing access to the private markets through mutual fund investment).
161
See infra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that some unicorns have two
classes of common stock, one of which is entitled to ten votes for each share held by the holder of
such common stock—typically, the Class B common stock).
162
One report states:
[T]he reported valuations of many unicorns have been inflated by the terms of the private investments that set those valuations before any initial public offerings of stock—
often with little or no disclosure of those terms. Increasingly, venture investors say,
late-stage financing terms include extra protections, like a discount to the price of any
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employees of the unicorns (who may or may not be stockholders depending on
whether they have exercised their options) remain in the dark about such
terms. Likewise, they do not understand the often-complex restated certificate
of incorporation because it is neither readily accessible nor easily understood.
To remedy this problem, the SEC should require unicorns to post their restated
certificate of incorporation on both the SEC website and the unicorn’s website.
In addition, unicorns should be required to highlight the key terms of the restated certificate of incorporation on the Form D filings in layperson’s language and provide relevant information about the company (such as the number of employees).
Lastly, the financial information that generally is only available to major
investors should be made available to all stockholders and employees via the
unicorn’s website. These statements should be furnished on a regular basis,
perhaps quarterly. Although major investors (who are always accredited investors) already receive the benefit of additional financial information as part of
the contractual arrangement in the investors’ rights agreement,163 the unaccredited investors and accredited investors who do not fall under the definition of
“Major Investor” (all of whom are typically smaller equity holders in the issuer) do not have access to this type of information. Both of these groups of investors should have better visibility into the financial state of the company. In
particular, this information may be important to rank-and-file employees who
become stockholders in the company as their shares vest.
This Article recommends that companies be required to comply with the
hybrid disclosure requirements within ninety days of closing a financing valued at $1 billion or more, because ninety days is typically the amount of time
allotted for closings that take place after the initial closing. If the valuation
falls below the $1 billion threshold in a later round, then the hybrid disclosure
would no longer apply. Although there may be additional costs associated with
an additional disclosure regime, it would be minimal because most companies
are already compiling the relevant information. For example, as mentioned
previously, financial statements are already prepared on a quarterly basis for
major investors. Summarizing the terms of the certificates of incorporation
may be more time consuming, but most of the key terms are available in the
term sheet. Although some may argue that hybrid disclosure may lead companies to reposition themselves to avoid new disclosure requirements, given the
high premium placed on billion-dollar valuations, that seems unlikely. In fact,
eventual initial offering, a minimum return on investment or extra shares if the company later raises money at a lower valuation.
Randall Smith, Protections for Late Investors Can Inflate Start-up Valuations, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (June 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/business/dealbook/protections-forlate-investors-can-inflate-start-up-valuations.html?mwrsm=Email [https://perma.cc/U7NE-W4YX].
163
See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text (discussing an Investors’ Rights Agreement).
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hybrid disclosures may result in companies going public earlier and foregoing
the mega-funding rounds described in Part IV below. 164
In 1964, Congress added section 12(g)(1) to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) “[t]o extend to investors in certain over-thecounter securities the same protection now afforded to those in listed securities
by providing that the issuers of certain securities now traded over the counter
shall be subject to the same requirements that now apply to issuers of securities
listed on an exchange.” 165 Prior to the 2012 amendment of section 12(g) of the
Exchange Act, a company was required to register a class of equity securities
with the SEC within 120 days after the end of its fiscal year if, on the last day
of the company’s fiscal year, there were 500 or more recordholders of such
class of securities and the company had assets totaling more than $10 million. 166 Title V of the JOBS Act amended section 12(g)(1)(A) of the Exchange
Act and kept the total assets requirement the same ($10 million), but provided
that a company would become subject to Exchange Act requirements within
120 days after the last day of its first fiscal year where it met the asset threshold and had a class of equity securities (other than exempted securities) held of
record by either: (i) 2000 persons or (ii) 500 persons who are not accredited
investors. 167
Under the newly revised section 12(g), private companies will not unintentionally go public (as was the case for Google). Therefore, we are faced
with a conundrum: the disclosures currently required of private companies are
inadequate for unicorns, but the disclosures required of public companies are
too burdensome. To resolve this issue, a hybrid approach is necessary to fill the
information gap and give unicorns the increased attention that they merit in
light of their enormous impact. To this end, this Article suggests that once a
company reaches a valuation of $1 billion or more it should be subject to the
enhanced disclosure requirements detailed above. The narrative that accompanies financial disclosures would demystify a unicorn’s strategy and inform
stockholders of the attendant risks and benefits of entering different markets
and their impact on local economies. Otherwise, we are left in a world where
the experience of employees at Square and Good Technology will remain
commonplace.
164

See infra notes 322–323 and accompanying text (discussing mega-funding rounds).
H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 1 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3027.
166
15 U.S.C. § 78l (g)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). In 2004, Google filed a Form 10 and a Form S-1 for its
IPO because it had exceeded the asset and stockholder threshold set forth in section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. ONLINE 43, 44 (2011), http://hblr.org/?p=1028 [https://perma.cc/7WR3-MUF3].
167
15 U.S.C. § 78l (g)(1)(A) (2012). Note that pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, “held
of record” does not include securities held by persons who received the securities pursuant to an employee compensation plan in transactions exempt from the registration requirements under section 5 of
the Securities Act of 1933. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1(a) (2015).
165
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III. FIVE CASE STUDIES OF UNICORNS
Part III examines five private companies—Airbnb, Dropbox, Pinterest,
Snapchat, and Uber—that have reached, and in fact surpassed, unicorn status. 168 These companies are all household names, even among those who are
not familiar with the technology industry. Each of these companies illustrates
the startling dearth of information required of private companies in Form D
filings and the information and power asymmetry that exists between major
stockholders—who are typically the lead investors in a particular round of financing—and all other stockholders.169 Although anyone can obtain a corporation’s certificate of incorporation from the Secretary of State of Delaware, 170
there is a fee, 171 and the certificate of incorporation does not include significant
information about the company. This Article argues that Form D should be
revised to include more specific information about board composition, the
168

See infra notes 174–321 and accompanying text.
Fenwick & West LLP recently analyzed the terms of thirty-seven U.S.-based venture-backed
companies that achieved unicorn status in the twelve months ending March 31, 2015; none of the
companies analyzed were named. The report stated its findings as follows:
169

•
•
•
•

Investors received terms that provided a fair amount of downside protection for
their investment, especially in the event of an acquisition, but relatively few upside benefits.
These terms could result in a divergence in interest between early and late stage
investors at the time of a liquidity event.
A significant percentage of the highest valuation unicorns had dual class common stock which provided founders/management and in some cases other shareholders with super voting rights.
Attaining a unicorn valuation appears to be a goal of promising companies raising money, as 35% of the companies we analyzed had valuations in the $1–1.1
billion dollar range, indicating that the companies may have negotiated specifically to attain the unicorn level.

BARRY J. KRAMER & NICOLE HARPER, FENWICK & WEST LLP, THE TERMS BEHIND THE UNICORN
VALUATIONS AS OF MARCH 31, 2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/TheTerms-Behind-The-Unicorn-Valuations.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPG4-TNJM] [hereinafter MARCH 2015
TERMS]. A subsequent study completed over a nine-month period ending December 31, 2015, yielded
similar results. The main difference noted by the study was the increase in unicorn financings, despite the
shorter duration. See BARRY J. KRAMER ET AL., FENWICK & WEST LLP, THE TERMS BEHIND UNICORN
VALUATIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/
The-Terms-Behind-the-Unicorn-Valuations-As-of-December-31-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/M225BKEE]. A significant amount of the activity, however, occurred at the beginning, with a marked decline
in the fourth quarter coupled with significantly more investor-friendly terms, such as increases in senior
liquidation preferences, IPO protection terms (such as downside protection and premium on the unicorn
price), and upside benefits. The per-share price for unicorn financings was fifty-seven times higher than
such company’s per-share price for its Series A financing. MARCH 2015 TERMS, supra, at 1–2.
170
This information is specific to the State of Delaware, due to the fact that Delaware is a common state of incorporation, known for its well-defined corporate law and efficiency. See FELD &
MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 170.
171
As an example, the author paid a copy fee for the Airbnb Restated Certificate of Incorporation
in the amount of $62, plus an additional $20 to expedite processing, for a total of $82.
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original share purchase price, protective provisions, voting arrangements, and
the like in layperson’s terms. 172 Furthermore, the revised Form D should be
coupled with periodic financial information and both should be included on the
unicorn’s website. 173
A. Airbnb
1. Overview of Airbnb
Airbnb is a home-sharing company that was incorporated in 2008 in the
State of Delaware. 174 In a few short years it has gone from just another startup
to media darling. 175 In 2015, the company was valued at $25.5 billion. 176
Anonymous sources have told The Wall Street Journal that Airbnb informed
investors that it is on course to exceed $900 million in revenue in 2015 177 (up
from $850 million as predicted earlier). 178 In 2013, it earned one-third of that
172

See infra note 321 and accompanying text (suggesting revisions to Form D requirements).
In the event that a unicorn relies on section 4(a)(2) instead of Regulation D, then the information required on a Form D (of which section 4(a)(2) does not have an equivalent) should be required of a company relying on such section. This Article argues that the information should be made
available on the company’s website. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012); supra notes 161–167 and accompanying text.
174
The company was formerly called Airbed & Breakfast, Inc. See Airbnb, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Dec. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Airbnb Form D], http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1559720/000116840415000029/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://
perma.cc/5PRX-U4EQ]. Like the other unicorns discussed in Part III, Airbnb continues to innovate. It
recently unveiled a price suggestion engine to help homeowners decide how much they should charge
per night for a stay in their home. See Ellen Huet, How Airbnb Uses Big Data and Machine Learning
to Guide Hosts to the Perfect Price, FORBES (June 5, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/
20160214153055/http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/06/05/how-airbnb-uses-big-data-andmachine-learning-to-guide-hosts-to-the-perfect-price/#3064370a379e.
175
Just as Uber has disrupted the transportation industry, Airbnb has disrupted the vacation rental
market:
173

Over the past few years, the sharing economy has matured from a fringe movement into
a legitimate economic force, with companies like Airbnb and Uber the constant subject
of IPO rumors. . . . No less an authority than New York Times columnist Thomas
Friedman has declared this the age of the sharing economy, which is “producing both
new entrepreneurs and a new concept of ownership.”
Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014,
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy/ [https://perma.cc/G88V-NYTN].
176
Sara Ashley O’Brien, ‘Crazy Money’—Airbnb Valued at Over $25 Billion, CNN MONEY
(June 27, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/27/technology/airbnb-funding-valuationupdate/ [https://perma.cc/NT83-NBVU].
177
Telis Demos, Airbnb Raises $1.5 Billion in One of Largest Private Placements, WALL STREET
J. (June 26, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-1-5-billion-in-one-of-largestprivate-placements-1435363506 [https://perma.cc/ZCL2-BZ2N].
178
Jillian D’Onfro, Airbnb Reportedly Is Raising Another $1 Billion, INC. (June 18, 2015), http://
www.inc.com/business-insider/airbnb-closing-new-round-of-valuation.html [https://perma.cc/EA6362MH].
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amount—$250 million. 179 Airbnb further claims that by 2020, its annual revenue will be $10 billion and that, by then, it will be profitable. 180 Yet, for the
time being, “the company is burning cash to expand, and forecasts an operating loss of about $150 million [for 2015].” 181 Airbnb reportedly has 600 employees. 182
If Airbnb were a public company, the information above regarding revenue, operating loss, and number of employees would be readily available to the
public and verified by the company’s accountants. Because the information
reported above came from scouring the Internet and was not supported by actual financial statements, however, the accuracy of the numbers cannot be ascertained.
2. Airbnb Form D
In a recent Form D filing, Airbnb reported that it was relying on Rule
506(c) of Regulation D for the offering and had 115 investors, none of whom
were unaccredited. 183 The amount of the offering and the total amount of securities sold was nearly $1.5 billion. 184 As is the case with most companies when
filing Form D, Airbnb declined to disclose its size (i.e., revenue). As evidenced
by Airbnb’s Form D, the information it requires is very limited and therefore
does not provide helpful data points for minority stockholders who lack access
to the type of information major investors typically receive.
3. Airbnb Restated Certificate of Incorporation
Airbnb’s Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Airbnb Restated Certificate”) provides insight into the control dynamics among the company and its
investors and founders. 185 It also illustrates the power asymmetry between the
major investors and smaller stockholders. Airbnb authorized 658,000,000
shares of Common Stock, of which half were designated as Class A Common
Stock and the other half as Class B Common Stock. 186 Airbnb also authorized
179

See Demos, supra note 177.
See id.
181
Rolfe Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, The Secret Math of Airbnb’s $24 Billion Valuation,
WALL STREET J. (June 17, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-math-of-airbnbs24-billion-valuation-1434568517 [https://perma.cc/7YTC-JZGW].
182
See Airbnb, WORLD ECON. F., http://reports.weforum.org/technology-pioneers-2014/companyprofiles/airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/2XAS-MJC4]. Note that the site does not state the date on which the
employee number was ascertained.
183
Airbnb Form D, supra note 174; see supra notes 19–44 and accompanying text (discussing
exempt offerings).
184
Airbnb Form D, supra note 174.
185
See Airbnb, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation (July 13, 2015) [hereinafter Airbnb
Restated COI] (on file with author).
186
See id. at 1.
180
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114,053,168 shares of Preferred Stock, which are designated as Series Seed
Preferred Stock, Series A Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, Series B-1
Preferred Stock, Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, and Series
E Preferred Stock. 187 Under the Airbnb Restated Certificate, each holder of
Class A Common Stock is entitled to one vote for each share of Class A Common Stock, and each holder of Class B Common Stock is entitled to ten votes
for each share of Class B Common Stock. 188
Before any payment may be made to the holders of Common Stock, the
holders of Preferred Stock have a liquidation preference: the greater of
(1) their respective original issue price, plus any dividends declared but unpaid, or (2) the amount per share that would be payable if all shares of Preferred Stock had been converted into Common Stock under the “Right to Convert” provision in the Airbnb Restated Certificate immediately prior to such
liquidation, dissolution, or winding up or Deemed Liquidation Event (as defined in the Airbnb Restated Certificate). 189 The holders of shares of Common
Stock will then get their pro rata shares of the remaining assets. 190 Essentially,
this means that unless minority stockholders were holders of Preferred Stock,
their liquidation preference would be paid after the holders of Preferred Stock
(and only if there was anything remaining).
Regarding the election of directors, the holders of Airbnb Series Seed Preferred Stock are entitled to elect one director, the holders of Series B and B-1
Preferred Stock are entitled to elect one director; the holders of Common Stock
are entitled to elect three directors; and the holders of Common Stock and every other class or series of voting stock, including the Preferred Stock, are entitled to elect the balance of the total number of directors of Airbnb on an as187
Id. at 1–2. Airbnb’s Preferred Stock is divided as follows: (1) 31,827,492 shares of Series
Seed Preferred Stock, with an original issue price of $0.01932292 per share; (2) 17,197,416 shares of
Series A Preferred Stock at $0.41866667 per share; (3) 17,351,343 shares of Series B Preferred Stock
at $6.62483333 per share; (4) 951,840 shares of Series B-1 Preferred Stock at $2.20828 per share; (5)
16,960,077 shares of Series C Preferred Stock at $11.7924 per share; (6) 12,765,000 shares of Series
D Preferred Stock at $40.71303333 per share; and (7) 17,000,000 shares of Series E Preferred Stock at
$93.0944 per share. See id. at 1–2, 5.
188
See id. at 2. Interestingly, the Airbnb Restated Certificate also provides that each outstanding
share of Class B Common Stock will automatically convert into one share of Class A Common Stock
upon the earlier of the vote or written consent of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding
shares of Class B Common Stock at the time of such vote and upon the twentieth anniversary of the consummation of an IPO. Id. at 3. This type of voting structure is similar to the dual-voting structure that has
become popular among companies that go public. See e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class
Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2012, 9:17 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-gives-google-founders-tighter-control/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/PU6C-ATGV] (listing Google and Facebook as examples). Under this structure, the
founders retain a significant degree of control because they are typically the largest holders of common stock in a company.
189
See Airbnb Restated COI, supra note 185, at 5.
190
See id.
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converted to Class B Common Stock basis (“Remaining Directors”). 191 The
voting structure indicates that the majority holders of each of the Series Preferred Stock, Series B and Series B-1 Preferred Stock, and Common Stock
have greater influence than the rank-and-file holders of Preferred Stock because they can choose the members of the board and, as a result, have access to
more information than a smaller stockholder of Preferred Stock. The Remaining Directors are voted on an as-converted to Class B Common Stock basis,
which means that each holder gets ten votes for each share of stock that he or
she holds. Put differently, the founders of Airbnb, who undoubtedly have the
largest holdings of Class B Common Stock, control the Common Stock seats
and have a significant voice in electing the Remaining Directors. The minority
stockholders therefore effectively have no voice in determining board composition.
As one might expect, there are extensive Preferred Stock protective provisions as well, both on a class basis and series preferred basis. 192 For each
series of Preferred Stock, with the exception of Series B and Series B-1 Preferred Stock (which vote together) and Series D Preferred Stock (which requires that 66 and 2/3% of the then outstanding shares of Series D Preferred
Stock must consent), a majority of the then-outstanding shares of each particular Series Preferred must consent before the rights, preferences, privileges, and
restrictions of that particular Series Preferred are altered, changed, or
waived. 193 Minority stockholders would only get the benefit of the protective
provisions if they were holders of Preferred Stock, and even then, the major
investors would control major decisions.
The Airbnb Restated Certificate also sets forth that at the time of conversion, each share of Preferred Stock will convert into Class B Common Stock,
which in turn gives its holders greater voting rights—ten votes for each share
of Class B Common Stock. 194 The mandatory conversion will occur upon ei191
See id. at 7. In the case of each Series Preferred director, as long as 50% of the shares of Preferred Stock originally issued remain outstanding, that particular Series Preferred will retain the right
to elect a director exclusively and vote as a separate class. See id.
192
See id. at 8–11.
193
See id. The Airbnb Restated Certificate, however, makes clear that the authorization or issuance of any existing or new series of Preferred Stock by Airbnb would not be deemed to be an adverse
alteration of, change in, or waiving of the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of that particular Series Preferred. See id. (specifying the class protective provisions and the protective provisions of
each of the Series Preferred stock and stating that at least 50% of the shares of each Series Preferred
originally issued under the applicable stock purchase agreement (except in the case of Series B and
Series B-1 Preferred Stock which can meet the 50% threshold together) must remain outstanding in
order for such Series Preferred’s protective provisions to remain in place). In the case of every Series
Preferred except for the Series D Preferred Stock that requires a 66 and 2/3% vote, a majority vote is
required if the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of such Series Preferred is altered,
changed, or waived. See id.
194
See id. at 24.
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ther (1) the closing of the sale of shares of Common Stock to the public in a
firm-commitment underwritten public offering, which would result, at a minimum, in $75 million of gross proceeds to Airbnb, or (2) the date and time, or
the occurrence of an event, as consented to by the holders of at least a majority
of the then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock. 195 Put differently, the major
investors would determine when the company would go public. Although minority stockholders could have life events—such as buying their first home and
having their first child—that would affect their decision whether to take the
company public (if they actually had a choice), major investors have no such
constraints. Major investors can theoretically wait to go public (and achieve
liquidity) at a much later date if it behooves them to do so.
Interestingly, shares of Series D Preferred Stock held as of the original issue date that were converted into Class B Common Stock pursuant to a Series
D Conversion Agreement are not subject to antidilution adjustments. 196 This
would give the holders of Series D Preferred Stock greater voting rights, but
not superior rights, preferences, and privileges in other instances, such as liquidation preference. If a minority stockholder had invested in the Series D Preferred Stock round of financing, he or she would now have more votes, but
would lose the rights, preferences, and privileges of holders of Preferred Stock.
Pursuant to the preferred stock protective provisions under the class protective provisions section, holders of the majority of the then-outstanding
shares of Preferred Stock must consent separately and together as a class on an
as-converted-to-the-appropriate-class-of-Common-Stock basis in the event
Airbnb redeems or repurchases any shares of Common Stock. 197 This in itself
is not unusual, because holders of Preferred Stock want to have the right to
carefully control the capitalization of the company. What is atypical, however,
is that this provision is not triggered as long as the aggregate amount of the
195
See id. Upon a mandatory conversion, all outstanding shares of Preferred Stock would convert
into shares of Class B Common Stock; however, the election of holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock is required to automatically convert the outstanding shares of
Series B Preferred Stock in connection with any Deemed Liquidation Event (as defined in the Airbnb
Restated Certificate) in which holders of Series B Preferred Stock received (or would be reasonably
expected to receive at the time of such conversion), an amount per share less than the Series B Preferred Stock Liquidation Amount. The same principle applies to the Series C Preferred Stock and
Series D Preferred Stock, except that in the case of the latter, the vote would need to be at least 66 and
2/3%. See id. at 24–25. In the case of Series E Preferred Stock, a majority of the outstanding shares of
Series E Preferred Stock would be required to convert the outstanding shares of Series E Preferred
Stock in connection with not only any Deemed Liquidation Event in which holders of Series E Preferred Stock receive at the closing of such transaction an amount per share less than the application
Liquidation Amount (as defined in Airbnb Restated Certificate) of the Series E Preferred Stock, but
also any equity financing of Airbnb in which the pre-financing valuation of the Company in such
financing is $8,000,000,000 or more. See id.
196
See id. at 15. In contrast, there is a special antidilution adjustment for Series C Preferred
Stock. See id. at 22–24.
197
See id. at 8–9.
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repurchase does not exceed $100 million per calendar year. 198 This provision
has implications for employees who hold options or who are already stockholders, because it means that Airbnb could choose to repurchase up to $100
million worth of employee options or shares without triggering the protective
provision. Typically, such repurchases are done at a much lower value than the
current value of the stock. 199 This could have negative repercussions for the
employees of unicorns, particularly if such employees foresee the stock increasing in value.
Under the terms of the antidilution carveouts, the board vote must include
either the Series Seed Director or Series B Director to: (1) increase the number
of shares reserved under any equity plan; and (2) approve shares of common
stock, options, or convertible securities issued (i) to banks, equipment lessors,
or financial institutions in connection with a debt financing or equipment leasing transaction, and (ii) in connection with sponsored research, collaboration,
technology license, development, OEM [original equipment manufacturing],
marketing, or other similar agreements or strategic partnerships.200 Accordingly, the major holders of Series Seed Preferred Stock or Series B Preferred
Stock have a higher degree of influence than the holders of Series A Preferred
Stock, Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, and Series E Preferred Stock who do not have designated board members other than as part of a
larger voting block of Common Stock and Preferred Stock, voting together.
This particular section demonstrates the key roles the Series Seed Director and
Series B Director play in the company decision-making process, because their
votes are required in key matters affecting the company, including the size of
the option pool. Minority stockholders and employees would most likely not
be aware of this fact.
Certain educated guesses can be made about the major stockholders of the
company, such as the fact that the holders of Series Seed Preferred Stock and
Series B Preferred Stock most likely have a major investor in each of those
Series Preferred that controls a majority of the shares of the outstanding Series
Seed Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, respectively. Furthermore,
198
See id. at 8. The shares repurchased refer to outstanding shares of common stock or options to
purchase shares of Common Stock from employees or other service providers in connection with an
employee liquidity or such similar program (as approved by the Board, or shares of Preferred Stock).
The rest of the section on class protective provisions is fairly standard and requires a vote of the Preferred Stock if there is an increase or decrease of the authorized number of shares of Common Stock
or Preferred Stock having a new class or series of equity securities having rights, preferences or privileges senior to or on parity with any series of Preferred Stock, declaring or paying any dividend,
changing the authorized number of Board members, liquidating Airbnb, or amending, altering, restating, waiving, or repealing any provision of the Restated Certificate that would adversely change the
rights, preferences, and privileges of the Preferred Stock. See id. at 8–9.
199
See infra notes 136–140 and accompanying text (discussing employee stock options).
200
See Airbnb Restated COI, supra note 185, at 14–15.
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these major investors have significant information rights via the Amended and
Restated Investors’ Rights Agreement in their capacity as board members. This
example highlights the fact that the minority stockholders have very little influence, if any, about the direction of the company, because there are voting
provisions that benefit the major stockholders when certain actions are taken
by Airbnb. Additionally, because the minority stockholders lack the same access to information that major stockholders have, they do not have any visibility into what is happening with the company. Lastly, based on the repurchase
provision in the antidilution carveouts, one can surmise that Airbnb anticipates
addressing employee liquidity issues through a repurchase program that does
not trigger antidilution.
B. Dropbox
1. Overview of Dropbox
Dropbox was incorporated in 2007 in the State of Delaware.201 It touts itself as a secure file sharing and cloud storage solution with an emphasis on
providing these services for businesses. 202 Since its inception, “it has added
300 million new users across 200 countries” 203 and was valued at $10 billion
more than two years ago. 204 Any information about the number of Dropbox
users or employees can only be gleaned from news reports. And like the numbers reported for Airbnb, they cannot be verified. In one article from April
2015, Dropbox reportedly had “over 1,200 employees—from about 500 a year
ago—working on a platform used by more than 300 million users world-

201

See Dropbox, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Feb. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Dropbox Form D], http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467623/000146762314000002/
xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://perma.cc/DKR3-H4UX]. Dropbox was originally known as
Evenflow, Inc. Id.
202
See Dropbox Business, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/business [https://perma.cc/
H4CT-7KBP]. Note that the homepage does not reference cloud storage, but just storage. See id.
Dropbox is now making inroads in the collaborative note-taking space as well. See Sarah Perez,
Dropbox’s Collaborative Note-Taking Service, Dropbox Notes, Heads into Beta Testing,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 23, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/23/dropboxs-collaborative-note-takingservice-dropbox-notes-heads-into-beta-testing/#.j6lqea:YCWc [https://perma.cc/QSC8-3SDM].
203
Eugene Kim, The Clock Is Ticking for Dropbox, Valued at $10 Billion More Than a Year Ago,
BUS. INSIDER (May 20, 2015, 7:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-clock-is-ticking-fordropbox-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/LJ85-DADG].
204
See id. Despite its successes, however, there are indications that the company is struggling.
See id.
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wide.” 205 In 2014, Dropbox was also rumored to have had revenue in the range
of $300 million to $400 million; in 2013 it was said to be $200 million. 206
2. Dropbox Form D
In its most recent Form D filing, filed on February 24, 2014, Dropbox reported that seventy-two investors have invested in the offering, none of whom
were unaccredited investors. 207 The federal exemption Dropbox relied on was
Rule 506(b) and the total offering amount was $450 million. 208 Dropbox declined to disclose its revenue range. 209
3. Dropbox Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation
Similar to Airbnb, Dropbox has three classes of stock: Class A Common
Stock, Class B Common Stock, and Preferred Stock. 210 Under the Dropbox
Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Dropbox Restated Certificate”), Dropbox authorized a total of 1,526,661,381 shares of its capital stock, of which
700,000,000 shares are Class A Common Stock, 600,000,000 shares are Class
B Common Stock, and 226,661,381 shares are Preferred Stock. 211 There are
four series of Preferred Stock: Series A Preferred Stock, Series A-1 Preferred
Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, and Series C Preferred Stock. 212
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of Dropbox, the
holders of each share of Preferred Stock then outstanding are entitled to be
paid their respective original issue price per share (or pro rata amount if the
full amount is not available) prior to the holders of Class A and Class B Common Stock. After the holders of Preferred Stock are paid their liquidation preference, the holders of Class A and Class B Common Stock will receive the remainder based on their respective pro rata share. 213 As is customary, the
205

Eugene Kim, Why Dropbox Only Expects Its Employees to Hit 70% of Their Goals, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 16, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-dropbox-motivates-employees-

2015-4 [https://perma.cc/CZ4V-26SD].
206
The Dropbox Valuation Is Irrational, CB INSIGHTS (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.
com/blog/dropbox-valuation-bubble/ [https://perma.cc/FHM8-FF7C].
207
Dropbox Form D, supra note 201.
208
Id. Dropbox also hired Allen & Company LLC and the Goldman Sachs Group to help facilitate the deal, paying $8,125,000 in sales commissions. See id.
209
See id.
210
See Dropbox, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation, exhibit 1, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Dropbox Restated COI] (on file with author).
211
See id.
212
The Preferred Stock is designated as follows: (1) 95,810,910 shares of Series A Preferred
Stock with an original issue price of $0.06263 per share; (2) 78,023,640 shares of Series A-1 Preferred
Stock with an original issue price of $0.01605; (3) 29,268,103 shares of Series B Preferred Stock with
an original issue price of $9.0491; and (4) 23,558,728 of Series C Preferred Stock with an original
issue price of $19.1012 per share. See id. at 2–3.
213
See id. at 5–6.
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deemed liquidation event is defined in the Dropbox Restated Certificate, unless
otherwise approved by the vote of each of the following: (1) the holders of at
least two-thirds of voting power of Preferred Stock then outstanding, as a separate class; (2) the holders of at least seventy percent in voting power of the
shares of Series B Preferred Stock then outstanding, as a separate series; and
(3) the holders of a majority in voting power of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock then outstanding, as a separate series. 214 In the case of Series B
Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock, a majority of the shares of each
such series originally issued must remain outstanding for such vote to be valid. 215 If minority stockholders are holders of Preferred Stock, they have the
superior liquidation preference given to such holders; however, it is unlikely
that they have a say in the decision-making process when such liquidation
event occurs.
Similar to Airbnb, the Dropbox Restated Certificate states that each holder of shares of Class A Common Stock is entitled to one vote for each share of
such stock; in the case of Class B Common Stock, the holder of Class B
Common Stock is entitled to ten votes for each share of such stock. Unlike
Airbnb, however, Dropbox states that each share of Preferred Stock is entitled
to ten votes for each share of Class B Common Stock into which the shares of
Preferred Stock could be converted.216 The founders of Dropbox likely hold
the Class B Common Stock, as it has superior voting rights to Class A Common Stock, which is most likely held by rank-and-file employees. Therefore,
employees will have minimal influence on any actions that require a vote, given the founders’ voting power.
Dropbox has authorized a five-member board of directors and the number
of directors cannot be altered without the consent of the holders of at least a
majority of the then-outstanding shares of (1) Preferred Stock, voting as a separate class; and (2) Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock, voting as a separate class. 217 The holders of Preferred Stock, voting as a separate
class, are entitled to elect one director (the “Dropbox Preferred Director”) and
the holders of Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock are entitled
to elect the remaining four. 218 Again, because the holders of Class B Common
Stock have ten votes for every share of such stock that they hold, they are effectively the stockholders who elect the remaining four directors.

214

See id. at 6.
See id.
216
See id. at 8.
217
See id. at 9.
218
See id. The Board election assumes that at least 45,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock are outstanding (as may be adjusted for additional stock splits, combinations, stock dividends, recapitalizations, reclassifications, and the like).
215
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The class protective provisions specify that Dropbox must obtain the approval of a majority in voting power of the then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock, voting as a single class, under certain circumstances. 219 This Article focuses on the protective provisions regarding any redemption or repurchase of Class A Common Stock or Class B Common Stock. Not only does
any redemption or repurchase of these classes require a majority vote of the
then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock, it also requires a seventy percent
vote of the then-outstanding Series B Preferred Stock and a majority vote of
the then-outstanding Series C Preferred Stock. 220 One of the less common provisions in the Dropbox Restated Certificate provides that Dropbox cannot effect a Liquidation Event (as defined in the Restated Certificate) in which each
holder of Series A Preferred Stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, or Series C Preferred Stock receives less than two times such
holder’s original issue price per share without the approval of a majority of the
then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock. 221 Additionally, there are specific,
separate protective provisions for Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock so long as a majority of the shares of these series originally issued
remains outstanding, respectively. 222 In the case of the Series B Preferred
Stock, the approval of the holders of at least seventy percent in voting power
of the then-outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock, voting together as a
single class, is required for certain actions to take place; 223 in the case of the
Series C Preferred Stock, approval of the holders of at least a majority in voting power of the then-outstanding shares of Series C Preferred Stock, voting
together as a single class, is required. 224 The specific threshold levels of votes
for the protective provisions are undoubtedly carefully calibrated to prevent
219
Most of the class protective provisions are fairly standard. For example, Dropbox must obtain
the approval of a majority of interest of the Preferred Stock then outstanding before it amends the
Dropbox Restated Certificate or bylaws in a way that materially and adversely affects the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of the Preferred Stock. See id. at 22.
220
The redemption or repurchase excludes the repurchase by Dropbox of shares of Class A
Common Stock or Class B Common Stock held by employees, officers, and others performing services for Dropbox or a subsidiary that are subject to restricted stock purchase agreements, stock option
exercise agreements, vesting agreements, or similar agreements under which Dropbox has the option
to repurchase such shares at cost, upon the occurrence of certain events (e.g., termination of employment or services); or at a price pursuant to Dropbox’s exercise of right of first refusal to repurchase
such shares (“Permitted Repurchases”) in the case of the Preferred Stock vote and “redemptions or
repurchases (i) that are Permitted Repurchases or (ii) pursuant to [Dropbox’s] rights of first refusal,”
in the case of the Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock votes. Id. at 22–23. Note that
the definition of Permitted Repurchases covers Dropbox’s exercise of a right of first refusal to purchase such shares although the right of first refusal is not specified as it is in the similar provision for
the respective votes of the Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock. See id. at 3.
221
See id. at 22.
222
See id. at 22–23.
223
See id. at 22.
224
See id. at 23.
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minority stockholders from having any influence over the decision-making
process.
The Dropbox Restated Certificate also specifies certain antidilution
carveouts. 225 In the event that any shares of Class A Common Stock, Class B
Common Stock, or Preferred Stock 226 issued or issuable after the applicable
original issue date are approved by the board of directors, which includes the
Dropbox Preferred Director, and are also approved by the holders of at least
seventy percent in voting power of the then-outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock and a majority in voting power of then-outstanding shares of Series C Preferred Stock, such shares will not trigger the antidilution adjustment. 227 Furthermore, each such approval must specifically state that such
shares shall be excluded from the definition of “Additional Shares” (which
would ordinarily trigger the antidilution adjustment).
The holders of at least a majority in voting power of the shares of Preferred Stock as a class or series of Preferred Stock then outstanding may waive
any of the rights, powers, preferences, and other terms of either the Preferred
Stock as a class or such series of Preferred Stock, provided that the holders of
two-thirds in voting power of the Preferred Stock then outstanding is required
when any rights of the holders of Preferred Stock are waived; seventy percent
in voting power of the Series B Preferred Stock then outstanding is required
when any rights of the Series B Preferred Stock are waived; and a majority in
voting power of the Series C Preferred Stock then outstanding is required
when any of the rights of the holders of Series C Preferred Stock are waived.228
It is clear, based on the information provided in the Dropbox Restated
Certificate, that the holders of Class A Common Stock, Class B Common
Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, and Series C Preferred Stock are the important players in Dropbox. The Class A Common Stock and Class B Common
Stock are most likely held by employees of the company and the founders, respectively. 229 The fact that the threshold level of separate approvals for the
holders of Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock are seventy
percent of the then-outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock and a majority of the Series C Preferred Stock indicates that the majority stockholder(s)
225

See id. at 13–15 (enumerating the antidilution carveouts under art. V, section 6.8(b)).
See id. at 15 (specifying in art. V, section 6.8(b)(i)(K), that options or warrants or rights to
acquire Class A Common Stock, Class B Common Stock, or Preferred Stock are also included in the
antidilution carveouts).
227
See Dropbox Restated COI, supra note 210, at 15.
228
See id. at 24.
229
The author makes this conclusion based on her own practice experience. Startups grant options
to purchase common stock to their employees to entice them with the possibility of a huge upside
when the company goes public. As the Class B Common Stock has ten votes for every one share, it is
almost certainly held by the founders of Dropbox so that they can exert greater control over decisions
that affect the future of Dropbox.
226
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most likely hold those respective amounts. Although the holders of Series A
Preferred Stock and Series A-1 Preferred Stock do not have the right to block
votes, as the Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock do, they
still have some leverage because their vote is needed to effect any of the actions enumerated in the protective provisions. This has repercussions for the
Amended and Restated Investors’ Rights Agreement; depending on who the
investors are, there is a strong possibility that only the Dropbox Preferred Director and perhaps a board observer designee of Series C Preferred Stock have
access to detailed information regarding the financials of Dropbox. Furthermore, the stringent repurchase provisions requiring three different types of
votes ensure that employees are unlikely to be able to sell their shares on the
secondary market.
C. Pinterest
1. Overview of Pinterest
Pinterest was originally incorporated in 2008 in the State of Delaware under the name Cold Brew Labs Inc. 230 Pinterest began as a place to store images, but now aims to “become the search engine for discovery, or the place to go
to when users are looking for new ideas.” 231 Users of the service compile
“pins” (photos and links that bookmark various sources) on personal, online
“boards” dedicated to their interests. 232 Since the site’s launch in 2010, the total number of pins has passed thirty billion.233 Pinterest recently struck ad deals
with General Mills, Kraft, Lululemon, and Gap. 234 In its last round of funding,
the company was valued at $11 billion—more than twice its previous round.235
Unlike Airbnb and Dropbox, reports of rumored revenue could not be found.
The only relevant number that could be located was the number of employees,
which was reportedly over 500. 236

230

See Pinterest, Inc., Eleventh Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (Feb. 27,
2015) [hereinafter Pinterest Restated COI] (on file with author).
231
Yoree Koh, Pinterest Valued at $11 Billion After Latest Funding, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 16,
2015, 5:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pinterest-raises-367-million-at-11-billion-valuation1426538379 [https://perma.cc/8T6F-SXDN].
232
What’s Pinterest?, PINTEREST, https://web.archive.org/web/20150910044755/https://business.
pinterest.com/en/whats-pinterest.
233
Douglas MacMillan, Pinterest Is Now Valued at $5 Billion, Despite Little Revenue, WALL
STREET. J.: DIGITS (May 15, 2014, 7:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/15/pinterest-isnow-valued-at-5-billion-despite-almost-no-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/36FR-EYBJ].
234
See id. Each of these companies paid for up to three- to six-month commitments at a price of
$1–2 million. Id.
235
See Koh, supra note 231.
236
Press, PINTEREST, https://about.pinterest.com/en/press [https://perma.cc/98PW-U4FB]. A
thorough Internet search was done to attempt to find relevant financial information.
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2. Pinterest Form D
In its most recent Form D filing, filed on March 16, 2015, Pinterest reported that fifteen investors participated in the offering, none of whom were
unaccredited investors. 237 This figure, however, only reflects the number of
investors in the offering—there is no information about who these investors
are, nor is there any indication of how much each of them invested.
The federal exemption Pinterest relied on was Rule 506(b) and the total
offering amount was $577,916,906, of which $367,099,927 was sold in the
initial closing. 238 Pinterest declined to disclose its revenue range. 239
3. Pinterest Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation
Pinterest’s Eleventh Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation
(“Pinterest Restated Certificate”) was filed with the Delaware Secretary of
State on February 27, 2015. 240 It authorized 340,000,000 shares of Common
Stock and 181,556,318 shares of Preferred Stock. 241 The Preferred Stock is
respectively designated as Seed 1 Preferred Stock, Seed 2 Preferred Stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock, Series A-2 Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock,
Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock,
Series F Preferred Stock, and Series G Preferred Stock. 242 Unlike Airbnb and
Dropbox, Pinterest does not have two classes of Common Stock; however, it
does have significantly more series of Preferred Stock, with two seed rounds
and eight preferred stock financing rounds. 243
The holders of Series B Preferred Stock are entitled to elect one director
of Pinterest (the “Pinterest Series B Director”), exclusively and as a separate

237

Pinterest, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Mar. 16, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1506293/000150629315000001/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml
[https://perma.cc/6NUC-JYRB].
238
See id.
239
See id.
240
Pinterest Restated COI, supra note 230, at 1.
241
See id. exhibit A, at 1.
242
The Preferred Stock is designated as follows with the following original issue prices: (1)
24,645,000 shares of Seed 1 Preferred Stock at $0.02 per share; (2) 19,713,850 shares of Seed 2 Preferred Stock at $0.0454 per share; (3) 2,852,500 Series A-1 Preferred Stock at $0.1928 per share; (4)
36,963,415 shares of Series A-2 Preferred Stock at $0.28328 per share; (5) 22,663,350 shares of Series B Preferred Stock at $1.195966 per share; (6) 12,855,850 shares of Series C Preferred Stock at
$7.77856 per share; (7) 18,502,932 shares of Series D Preferred Stock at $10.8091 per share; (8)
15,484,454 shares of Series E Preferred Stock at $14.5307 per share; (9) 11,774,967 shares of Series F
Preferred Stock at $16.98518 per share; and (10) 16,100,000 shares of Series G Preferred Stock at
$35.89546 per share. See id. at 1–3.
243
See id. at 1.
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series. 244 Likewise, the holders of Series A-1 and A-2 Preferred Stock, voting
together, exclusively and as a separate class and on an as-converted basis, are
entitled to elect one director (the “Pinterest Series A Director”). 245 The holders
of Common Stock are entitled to elect two directors (the “Pinterest Common
Directors”), exclusively and as a separate class.246 The holders of the Common
Stock and Preferred Stock vote on the balance of the total number of directors,
together as a single class and on an as-converted basis. 247 Based on the Preferred Stock protective provisions, the authorized number of directors is
four. 248 Individually, minority stockholders do not have enough votes to impact
the outcome for the Pinterest Common Directors in any meaningful way. Additionally, they will not have access to information that board members receive
in their capacity as such.
One of the unusual provisions in the Pinterest Restated Certificate is the
fact that Ben Silbermann, the President and CEO, is entitled to three votes in
his capacity as a member of the Board of Directors (the “Special Director
Vote”), but such right is not applicable to matters relating to his compensation. 249 Furthermore, if the two Pinterest Common Director seats are occupied,
Mr. Silbermann’s Special Director Vote is reduced to two votes. 250 Although
there is only one class of Common Stock, as one of the co-founders of Pinterest, Mr. Silbermann exercises a significant degree of influence over Pinterest
through the Special Director Vote. 251 It would be important for investors in
Pinterest to have access to this information to accurately understand the power
dynamics within the company and the degree of the CEO’s influence.
Under the Preferred Stock protective provisions, the approval of sixty
percent of then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock, voting together as a single class on an as-converted basis, is required under certain enumerated circumstances. 252 Unlike Airbnb and Dropbox, Pinterest’s class protective provisions regarding the purchase, redemption, payment, or declaration of any divi244

Id. at 7. At least 11,331,675 shares of Series B Preferred Stock, subject to adjustment in the
event of any stock dividend, stock split, combination or the like, must remain outstanding in order to
retain the right to elect the Pinterest Series B Director. See id.
245
See id. At least 19,907,955 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock and/or Series A-2 Preferred
Stock, subject to adjustment in the event of any stock dividend, stock split, combination or the like,
must remain outstanding in order to retain the right to elect the Pinterest Series A Director. See id.
246
See Pinterest Restated COI, supra note 230, exhibit A, at 7.
247
See id.
248
See id. at 8. Having an even number of board members is unusual as companies typically want
an odd number in the event of a tie; that being said, the Special Director Vote would effectively make
it an odd vote. See id. at 7–8.
249
See id.
250
See id. at 8.
251
See Nicholas Carlson, Pinterest CEO: Here’s How We Became the Web’s Next Big Thing
(DECK), BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/pinterest-foundingstory-2012-4 [https://perma.cc/9E9J-TDL2] (describing Ben Silbermann’s role in founding Pinterest).
252
Pinterest Restated COI, supra note 230, exhibit A, at 8.
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dend or distribution on any shares of capital stock of Pinterest excludes the
“repurchases of stock from former employees, officers, directors, consultants
or other persons who performed services for [Pinterest] . . . in connection with
the cessation of such employment or service, at the lower of the original purchase price or the then-current fair market value thereof” pursuant to board
approval. 253 The Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, Series F
Preferred Stock, and Series G Preferred Stock also have separate series protective provisions. 254
In the case of each of the aforementioned series of Preferred Stock, as
long as approximately twenty-five percent of the originally issued shares of
each series remains outstanding, Pinterest cannot take any action to: (1) amend
the Pinterest Restated Certificate or bylaws which would alter the rights, preferences, powers, or special rights of the particular series of Preferred Stock
without similarly affecting the entire class of Preferred Stock; or (2) issue or
obligate itself to issue more than the number of that series of Preferred Stock
specified in the Restated Certificate as the authorized number for that series of
Preferred Stock. 255 As in the vast majority of venture capital financings, the
voting thresholds are drafted in such a way that the control of the Preferred
Stock, voting as a class, or a particular series of Preferred Stock, voting as a
separate series, remains in the hands of the major investors. Again, having this
kind of information available in a Form D would be helpful in giving different
types of stockholders a clearer picture of the voting structure of the organization and whether voting blocks are possible.
The Pinterest Restated Certificate also provides for mandatory conversion
of Preferred Stock to Common Stock in the event of either (1) the closing of
the sale of shares of Common Stock to the public in a firm commitment underwritten public offering amounting to at least $50 million of gross proceeds
to Pinterest (the “Pinterest Qualified IPO”); or (2) such date, time, or particular
event specified by the holders of at least sixty percent of the the-outstanding
shares of Preferred Stock, voting together as a single class on an as-converted
basis. 256 If, however, the mandatory conversion is a “Deemed Liquidation
Event” as that term is defined in the Pinterest Restated Certificate under scenario (2) above, then Pinterest must also have the approval of the holders of
the majority of Series B Preferred Stock, Series C Preferred Stock, Series D
Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, Series F Preferred Stock, and Series
G Preferred Stock, each voting as a separate class (and not together).257 There
253

See id. at 8.
See id. at 9–10.
255
See id. The Series D Preferred Stock protective provision has a 60% threshold for its approval,
whereas the Series E, F, and G Preferred Stock have a majority threshold. See id.
256
See id. at 21–22.
257
See id. at 22.
254
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is also a redemption provision in the Pinterest Restated Certificate.258 Both the
mandatory conversion and redemption provisions illustrate yet again the power
of the major investors in the event of a Deemed Liquidation Event or a redemption.
D. Snapchat
1. Overview of Snapchat
Snapchat was incorporated in 2012 in the State of Delaware. 259 Valued at
$16 billion, Snapchat is a messaging app company known as a platform for
“selfies” and videos that quickly disappear after the receiver has viewed
them. 260 Like the other companies discussed in this Article, it continues to expand its reach. 261
258
See id. at 23. A redemption right gives investors the right to have their shares redeemed by a
company on a particular date; in the case of Pinterest, the holders of at least 72% of the Preferred
Stock, voting together as a single class on an as-converted basis, can request such redemption any
time on or after February 27, 2025. See id.; see also MODEL COI, supra note 72, at 33 n.60 (noting
that redemption provisions are not more typical of East Coast than West Coast venture capital financings).

However, in the wake of the Delaware Chancery Court’s 2009 opinion in [In] re Trados
Inc. S’holder Litigation, . . . investors may be foregoing a substantial protection/benefit
if they do not have the right to put their shares back to the company at a time when they
may wish to seek the sale of the company.
See MODEL COI, supra note 72, at 33 n.60 (citing In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 39
(Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013)).
259
Snapchat, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (May 28, 2015) [hereinafter
Snapchat Form D], http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1564408/000163845415000002/xsl
FormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://perma.cc/3DCN-LMZE].
260
Snapchat was valued at $16 billion during its last round of funding. See Leslie Picker & Sarah
Frier, Snapchat Said to Be Valued at $16 Billion in New Fundraising, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 29,
2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-29/snapchat-said-to-be-valued-at16-billion-in-new-fundraising [https://perma.cc/PK84-DVGC]; Kyle Sanford, Snapchat Valuation Not
Disappearing, PITCHBOOK DATA, INC. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/snapchatvaluation-not-disappearing [https://perma.cc/LPR2-2M4W] (noting that Snapchat retained its $16billion valuation despite reports that Fidelity had marked down its investments in the company). Users
can “draw” on their photos, add captions, and decide how long their photos can remain visible to receivers. See Alexis C. Madrigal, What Is Snapchat?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/what-is-snapchat/281551/ [https://perma.cc/L5HK-94NC].
261
According to blog postings on the Snapchat website, Snapchat offers Snapcodes (allowing
users to add friends to Snapchat), Snapchat Discover (allowing users to explores stories through different editorial teams), Snapcash (allowing users to use their debit cards to send money to friends’
bank accounts), and Our Campus Story (allowing users to adds to stories happening on a particular
college campus), to name a few. See Introducing Discover, SNAPCHAT BLOG (Jan. 27, 2015), http://
blog.snapchat.com [https://perma.cc/V6H9-ETFQ]; Introducing Snapcash, SNAPCHAT BLOG (Nov.
24, 2014), http://blog.snapchat.com [https://perma.cc/V6H9-ETFQ]; Our Campus Story, SNAPCHAT
BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/100253858835/our-campus-story [https://perma.
cc/K9RQ-2JBA]; Snapcodes, SNAPCHAT BLOG (May 4, 2015), http://blog.snapchat.com [https://
perma.cc/V6H9-ETFQ]. Snapchat also just ventured into political advertising, landing its first political
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According to its LinkedIn profile, Snapchat has between 51 and 200 employees. 262 As with Pinterest, information about Snapchat’s revenue is not
readily available, so stockholders and employees alike (unless they are major
investors) have no visibility into the financial state of the company.
2. Snapchat Form D
In its most recent Form D filing, filed on May 28, 2015, Snapchat reported that thirty-five investors had invested in the offering, none of whom were
unaccredited investors. 263 The federal exemption they relied on was Rule
506(b) and the total offering amount was $650 million. 264
3. Snapchat Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation
Snapchat’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Snapchat Restated Certificate”) was filed with the Delaware Secretary of State on
February 13, 2015. 265 Snapchat has 1,248,729,280 shares of Common Stock,
of which 730,000,000 shares are Class A Common Stock and 70,000,000
shares are Class B Common Stock. 266 The Class A Common Stock has one
vote per share and the Class B Common Stock, unlike the Class B Common
Stock of Airbnb and Dropbox, has no voting rights (except as required by
law). 267 Under the Restated Certificate, Snapchat authorized 448,729,280
shares of Preferred Stock, which are divided into the following series: Series A
Preferred Stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock, and Series B Preferred Stock (the
three of which comprise the “Snapchat Voting Preferred”); Series C Preferred
Stock (which combines with the Snapchat Voting Preferred to make the “Snapchat Prior Preferred”); Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and
Series F Preferred Stock (the three of which combine with the Snapchat Prior
Preferred to make the “Snapchat Investor Preferred”); and Series FP Preferred
Stock (which, together with the Snapchat Investor Preferred, makes the “Snapchat Series Preferred”).268
ad with the American Action Network, an outside group with close ties to the House Republican leadership. See Ashley Parker, A First for Snapchat, N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT (June 6, 2015, 1:16 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/06/06/a-first-for-snapchat/?_r= 0 [https://perma.cc/
955F-ZHX2].
262
Snapchat, Inc., LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/snapchat [https://perma.cc/
S3PA-5GFM].
263
Snapchat Form D, supra note 259.
264
Id.
265
See Snapchat, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 1 (Feb. 13, 2015)
[hereinafter Snapchat Restated COI] (on file with author).
266
See id.
267
See id. at 16–17.
268
See id. at 1–2. Snapchat’s Preferred Stock is divided as follows: (1) 70,288,840 shares of Series A Preferred Stock, with the original issue price of $0.208515 per share; (2) 35,741,260 shares of

2016]

Regulating Unicorns

629

Unlike the other private companies that are discussed in this Part, the
original issue price of Snapchat’s Preferred Stock has fluctuated significantly. 269 This has implications for stockholders, as the holders of preferred stock
will get an antidilution adjustment so that they are made whole when the price
per share decreases in subsequent rounds of financings.
The voting rights are atypical in that the holders of Series FP Preferred
Stock are entitled to the number of votes equal to ten times the number of
shares of Class A Common Stock into which such shares of Series FP Preferred Stock could be converted. 270 Furthermore, if the vote or approval of
Snapchat’s Preferred Stock is required by law, then the Snapchat Series Preferred shall vote together as a class on an as-converted basis. 271 In addition to
the protective provisions for the Snapchat Voting Preferred, each series of Preferred Stock has a separate vote. 272 But other than the separate series vote that
the holders of Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and Series F Preferred Stock are entitled to under the terms of the
Snapchat Restated Certificate, these specified holders of Preferred Stock will
have no voting rights and are not entitled to vote on any matter. 273 It would be
helpful for minority stockholders to understand the difference between Series
FP Preferred Stock voting rights and the voting rights of other holders of Preferred Stock.
Furthermore, an increase in the size of the Board of Directors to more
than four, unless it is to increase the size by one director for a new CEO of
Snapchat, would require the vote or written consent of the holders of the majority of the outstanding Class A Common Stock, Series FP Preferred, and
Series A-1 Preferred Stock at $0.01453 per share; 40,932,220 shares of Series B Preferred Stock at
$1.95445 per share; 16,000,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock at $3.40893 per share; 5,000,000
shares of Series D Preferred Stock at $0.001 per share; 42,000,000 shares of Series E Preferred Stock
at $0.001 per share; 21,000,000 shares of Series F Preferred Stock at $0.001 per share; and
217,766,960 shares of Series FP Preferred Stock at $0.000020835 per share. See id. at 2–3.
269
See id.
270
See id. at 3.
271
See id. at 4.
272
See id. at 4–7.
273
See id. at 6–7. Under the separate series vote, as long as at least 50% of the Series C Preferred
Stock remains outstanding (as adjusted for any stock dividends, combinations, splits, recapitalizations,
and the like) the holders of Series C Preferred Stock are entitled to a separate series vote on (i) any
amendments, alterations, or repeal of any provision of the Certificate of Incorporation that adversely
alters or changes the voting or other powers of the Series C Preferred Stock different from other classes of stock with the proviso that any change to the authorized capital of Snapchat or issuing one or
more series of capital stock or any other securities convertible into equity securities of Snapchat will
not be deemed to affect the Series C Preferred Stock adversely, and (ii) any increase or decrease in the
authorized number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock. See id. The holders of Series D Preferred
Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and Series F Preferred Stock are only allowed to vote or give their
written consent only as required under section 242(b)(2) of the DGCL or as otherwise required under
applicable law. See id. at 7.
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Snapchat Voting Preferred, voting together as a single class on an as-converted
basis. 274 Therefore, the size of the Snapchat board is most likely determined by
the votes of the Class A Common Stock and Series FP Preferred.275 The Voting
Preferred, voting as a separate class on an as-converted basis, is entitled to
elect one director and that director shall be entitled to one vote on all matters at
the board meetings or in connection with any written consent. 276 The holders
of Series FP Preferred Stock, voting as a separate class on an as-converted basis, are entitled to elect two directors (each, the “Series FP Director” and, together, the “Series FP Directors”) and each of those directors is “entitled to that
number of votes per director equal to the number of total authorized directors
of the Board of Directors at the time of such vote” on all matters at the board
meetings or in connection with any written consent. 277 For example, if there
are four board members, then each Series FP Director would get four votes. In
other words, the Series FP Directors would control the decision-making process. Lastly, the holders of Class A Common Stock, Series FP Preferred Stock,
and Snapchat Voting Preferred, voting together as a single class on an asconverted basis, are entitled to elect all remaining members of the board; such
director(s) would be entitled to one vote. 278
The protective provisions for the Snapchat Voting Preferred necessitates
the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding Snapchat Voting
Preferred, voting together as a single class on an as-converted basis, in order
for Snapchat to effect any redemption, repurchase, or payment of dividends
with respect to Common Stock or Preferred Stock. 279 The Snapchat Restated
Certificate, however, excluded from such definition:
[the] acquisitions of capital stock pursuant to agreements under
which [Snapchat] has the option to repurchase shares at no more
than cost upon the occurrence of certain events, such as the termination of employment or service, [and] acquisitions of capital stock in
the exercise of [Snapchat’s] right of first refusal to repurchase such
shares . . . [and] repurchases or dividend payments approved by the
Board, including the vote of the Preferred Director, if such Preferred
Director is a member of the Board at the time. 280

274

See id.
The author deduced this by calculating the number of votes the Class A Common Stock and
Series FP Preferred Stock would have voting together.
276
See Snapchat Restated COI, supra note 265, at 7–8.
277
Id. at 8.
278
See id.
279
See id. at 8–9.
280
Id. at 5.
275
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Regarding the liquidation preference, the holders of Snapchat Prior Preferred would be entitled to any distribution or payment upon such “Liquidation
Event” (as defined in the Snapchat Restated Certificate) before any such distribution or payment is made to the Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred
Stock, Series F Preferred Stock, Series FP Preferred Stock, or any Common
Stock. 281 Any remaining assets after the payment of the full liquidation preference of the Snapchat Prior Preferred would be distributed ratably to the holders
of the Common Stock. 282 Provisions are also made for the Snapchat Series Preferred in the event of any Liquidation Event. 283
Each share of Snapchat Series Preferred automatically converts into
shares of Class A Common Stock (1)(a) for the Snapchat Investor Preferred,
upon the affirmative election of the holders of the majority of the outstanding
shares of Snapchat Voting Preferred, or (b) for the Series FP Preferred Stock,
upon the affirmative election of the holders of the majority of the outstanding
shares of Series FP Preferred Stock; or (2) for the Snapchat Investor Preferred
only, upon the closing of a firmly underwritten public offering covering the
offer and sale of Class A Common Stock for Snapchat, which would result in
gross proceeds of at least $25 million. 284 There is also an unusual provision
under the “Automatic Conversion” section of the Snapchat Restated Certificate. Any shares of Series FP Preferred purchased by an investor of Snapchat
in connection with an equity financing in which it sells, at minimum, $1 million worth of a newly-created series of Preferred Stock, such shares of Series
FP Preferred Stock automatically convert immediately prior to such transfer
into shares of Preferred Stock sold in the equity financing described above. 285
It is important for both employees and minority stockholders to understand the
implications of the board composition, liquidation preference, protective provisions, and conversion provisions described above to better comprehend the
power dynamics of the board of directors, as well as their rights relative to others.

281

See id. at 9.
See id.
283
See id.
284
See id. at 14.
285
See id. Any shares of Series FP Preferred Stock transferred, other than pursuant to the equity
financing, in which the Series FP Preferred Stock no longer retains voting power automatically converts, immediately prior to such transfer, into shares of Class A Common Stock. See id.
282
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E. Uber
1. Overview of Uber
Uber 286 was founded in 2009 and has since roared ahead of its competitors—Lyft and Sidecar—in the so-called “sharing economy.” 287 It has raised
$5.5 billion to date 288 and was valued at $41 billion during its last round of
financing. 289 On its website, the company describes itself as follows: “Uber’s a
smartphone app that connects people with cars with people looking for rides
around town. Uber is the easy new way to turn your car into a cash machine
and get paid weekly in fares for driving.” 290 Using a software tool dubbed
“God View,” Uber can see all vehicles on the Uber system and can pinpoint the
location of every customer looking at the app on their smartphone.291 Investors
ranging from Google Ventures to Benchmark Capital to tech luminary Jeff Bezos (through Bezos Expeditions) have invested in Uber. 292
286
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/main-streetportfolios-are-investing-in-unicorns.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LA5H-6J8N] (noting that Uber is
now valued at $50 billion); Maria Aspan, Most Startups Will Never Be Unicorns—And That’s Okay,
INC. (May 12, 2015), http://www.inc.com/maria-aspan/uber-and-why-most-startups-are-no-unicorns.
html [https://perma.cc/H7CD-D32E] (citing the growing divide between the haves and have-nots in
the startup world and touting Uber as a leader among unicorns in receiving funding).
287
The sharing economy means “using technology to connect consumers with goods and services
that would otherwise go unused.” Marcus Wohlsen, What Uber Will Do with All That Money from
Google, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/uber-travis-kalanick/
[https://perma.cc/5PKT-8DY2]. In the case of Uber, it was a way to profit from limos and cabs that
would otherwise be idle:

In San Francisco, Uber has become its own noun—you “get an Uber.” But to make it a
verb—to get to the point where everyone Ubers the same way they Google—the company must outperform on transportation the same way Google does on search. No less
than Google itself believes Uber has this potential. In a massive funding round in August led by the search giant’s venture capital arm, Uber received $258 million. The investment reportedly valued Uber at around $3.5 billion and pushed the company to the
forefront of speculation about the next big tech IPO—and [Uber Co-founder and CEO
Travis] Kalanick as the next great tech leader.
Id.

288
See Uber Has Raised Nearly as Much Funding as All Other US on-Demand Startups Combined, CB INSIGHTS (July 7, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/uber-bigger-entire-on-demandeconomy/ [https://perma.cc/W2MW-YTN4]. To put Uber’s fundraising into context, the rest of the
U.S. on-demand economy has raised $5.9 billion. See id.
289
Alyson Shontell, Uber Raises $1.2 Billion at a $41 Billion Valuation, Vows to Become
‘Smarter and More Humble,’ BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/uber-just-raised-12-billion-2014-12 [https://perma.cc/62RR-HW2K].
290
Apply to Drive with Uber, UBER, https://get.uber.com/cl/search/ [https://perma.cc/Q4AD7DYY].
291
Wohlsen, supra note 287.
292
See id. (stating that Google’s investment arm led a $258-million financing in August 2013);
see also Alexia Tsotsis, Uber Gets $32M from Menlo Ventures, Jeff Bezos and Goldman Sachs,
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Uber is the poster child for unicorns. As mentioned in Part II, Uber has
over 3000 employees (a more specific number is not available). 293 The most
detailed look at Uber’s revenue was based on a leaked internal slide deck from
early 2014, which was itself based primarily on December 2013 numbers. 294
According to the slide deck, in the month of December 2013, Uber generated
$18 million in revenue in San Francisco alone. 295 Although the author of the
2014 report stated that this would mean $212 million in annual revenue, such
extrapolation fails to take into account seasonal fluctuations and other factors. 296 Another news article stated: “Gross revenue [for Uber] is expected to
hit a run rate of $10 billion by the end of [2015]. . . . Uber’s revenue growth
rate . . . [was] about 300% [in 2014] and it [was] expected to be another 300%
[in 2015].” 297 Furthermore, according to this article, the company’s current
revenue derives from only a few of the over 150 cities in which it operated as
of November 2014. 298 Interestingly, in that same month, a different reporter
from the same publication stated that Uber was in 230 cities. 299 More recently,
it was reported that Uber operates in 300 cities. 300 Clearly, there is no reliable
source of up-to-date information on the scope of Uber’s operations. This is yet
another reason why enhanced disclosure in a centralized location, such as a
unicorn’s website, is necessary. The disconnect between what is reality and
what is myth can only be resolved by having the type of disclosure for which
this Article argues.
Despite Uber’s successes, however, the company is facing challenges. For
example, it claims that its median driver makes $90,766 annually, but it has not
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 7, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/12/07/uber-announces-32-million-infunding/ [https://perma.cc/TF79-JAQ4].
293
Kosoff & McAlone, supra note 109. Note that Uber does not consider its drivers to be employees. See Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber’s Employment Fight Just Got More Complicated, FORBES (Mar.
4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/04/uber-driver-unemployment/ [https://perma.cc/8TZB-Y5YC]
(discussing Uber drivers’ class action lawsuit against Uber asserting that Uber misclassifies drivers as
independent contractors rather than employees).
294
See Alyson Shontell, LEAKED: Internal Uber Deck Reveals Staggering Revenue and Growth
Metrics, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenuerides-drivers-and-fares-2014-11# [https://perma.cc/SNN3-8MLL].
295
See id. (extrapolating that if one assumes $18 million in revenue is generated per month, then
the San Francisco market would be worth $212 million). Of course, this type of extrapolation is not
accurate, and the reporter was merely guessing at what the total revenue would be.
296
See id. The reporter should have used the term gross revenue, as the amount does not take into
account that Uber receives 20% of the transaction fees. Also $18 million times twelve months equals
$216 million (not $212 million).
297
Henry Blodget, Now I Know Why Investors Are Going Hog Wild About Uber, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 13, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-revenue-2014-11 [https://perma.cc/
VA9A-8XR5] (noting that Uber would receive 20% of the $10 billion, which would amount to $2
billion—and the rest would go to Uber’s drivers).
298
See id.
299
See Shontell, supra note 289.
300
Isaac & Singer, supra note 104.
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been able to substantiate that number. 301 With falling fare prices and increases
in Uber’s commissions, drivers are increasingly disillusioned with the company and its promises: 302
From London to San Francisco to New York, they’ve banded together to protest against Uber. The rhetoric they once saw as uplifting now seems deceptive and manipulative. Slowly but surely, Uber
drivers are questioning whether Uber’s promises about wages and
“small business” opportunities are actually aligned with reality. And
in New York, the birthplace of this grass-roots labor movement,
$90,766 is starting to flicker out. 303
Furthermore, unlike the virtual services delivered by Google and Facebook, Airbnb’s and Uber’s services are delivered physically and locally. Accordingly, as Uber develops, it is subject to the unique regulatory, political, and
cultural landscape of each individual city in which it operates. 304 Put differently, unicorns like Uber can affect entire local ecosystems—for better or worse—
and still not be subject to any measures of transparency, such as making their
financial information publicly available.
2. Uber Form D
In its most recent Form D, filed on May 12, 2015, Uber reported that 142
investors had invested in the offering. 305 The federal exemption they relied on
was Rule 506(c) and the total offering amount was $2,803,326,002. 306

301

See Griswold, supra note 107.
See id.
303
Id.
304
See William H. Janeway, Unicorns: Why This Bubble Is Different, FORBES (May 28, 2015,
12:31 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20160131203453/http://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/
2015/05/28/unicorns-why-this-bubble-is-different/#5ac086007ee7. One author comments:
302

Consequently, as [Uber and similar services have] been learning city by city, they are
subject to local ecosystems that have evolved around the provision of such services:
regulatory, political, cultural. The London taxi industry is not the same as that of New
York nor San Francisco. The unbounded growth rates implicit in their valuations are
subject to exogenous impediments that may induce step-function revaluations of growth
prospects.
Id.

305
Uber Technologies, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (May 12, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000154315115000002/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.
xml [https://perma.cc/4JXM-PWAR].
306
Id.
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3. Uber Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation
Uber filed its Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Uber Restated Certificate”) with the Delaware Secretary of State on May 26, 2015. 307 It authorized 2,496,670,392 shares of Common Stock, of which 1,558,693,776 was designated Class A Common Stock and 937,976,616 was designated Class B
Common Stock. 308 Uber also authorized 755,051,371 shares of Preferred
Stock, respectively designated as Series Seed Preferred Stock, Series A Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, Series C Preferred Stock (consisting of
Series C-1 Preferred Stock, Series C-2 Preferred Stock, and Series C-3 Preferred Stock), Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and Series F
Preferred Stock. 309
As with Airbnb and Dropbox, the holders of Class B Common Stock are
entitled to ten votes per share. 310 In addition, the holders of Series Seed Preferred Stock, Series A Preferred Stock, and Series B Preferred Stock are each
entitled to ten votes for each share of Class B Common Stock into which such
series could then be converted. 311 In contrast, the holders of Series C Preferred
Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and Series F Preferred Stock are entitled to one vote for each share of Class A Common Stock
into which such series could then be converted. 312
The holders of Series A Preferred Stock, voting together as a separate
class on an as-converted basis, are entitled to elect one director.313 The holders
of Series C-2 Preferred Stock, voting together as a separate class on an asconverted basis, are also entitled to elect one director. 314 The holders of Class
B Common Stock, voting separately as a single class, are entitled to elect six
directors of Uber. 315 One of the most unusual provisions in the Uber Restated
307
See Uber Technologies, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation 1 (May 26, 2015) [hereinafter Uber Restated COI] (on file with author).
308
See id.
309
See id. at 1–3. The Preferred Stock is designated as follows: (1) 174,029,880 shares of Series
Seed Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $0.0090625; (2) 152,053,436 shares of Series
A Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $0.0924825 per share; (3) 123,645,856 shares of
Series B Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $0.354475 per share; (4) 76,551,280
shares of Series C-1 Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $3.5635 per share; (5)
31,003,680 shares of Series C-2 Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $2.8508 per share;
(6) 841,864 shares of Series C-3 Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $3.5635 per share;
(7) 87,193,208 shares of Series D Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $15.51305 per
share; (8) 84,504,220 shares of Series E Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of
$33.317575 per share; and (9) 25,227,947 shares of Series F Preferred Stock with an original purchase
price of $39.638581 per share. See id.
310
See id. at 26.
311
See id. at 19.
312
See id.
313
See id.
314
See id.
315
See id.
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Certificate states that the holders of Series Seed Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, Series C-1 Preferred Stock, Series C-3 Preferred Stock, Series D
Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, Series F Preferred Stock, and Class
A Common Stock cannot vote in the election or removal of any directors. 316
The Uber Restated Certificate further provides that each share of Preferred Stock automatically converts into shares of Class A Common Stock or
Class B Common Stock in the event of a Preferred Stock Conversion Event (as
defined in the Uber Restated Certificate) or an IPO of at least $30 million (net
of underwriting discounts and commissions). 317
Furthermore, although the holders of the Preferred Stock are entitled to
receive their investment back prior and in preference to holders of Class A
Common Stock or Class B Common Stock in the event of any liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of Uber, the Series C Preferred Stock will receive 1.25
times its respective original issue price. 318
In addition to an extensive list of Preferred Stock protective provisions,
there are also protective provisions for each series of Preferred Stock. 319 It is
customary for securities repurchased from former employees, officers, directors, consultants, or other persons who performed services for Uber or any of
its subsidiaries in connection with the cessation of such employment or service
at the lower of the original purchase price or the then-current fair market value
to be excluded from the Preferred Stock protective provision. 320 Securities repurchased by Uber as approved by Uber’s board (including at least one Preferred Director so long as such director or any of his or her affiliates is not involved in such repurchase) are also excluded. Although all this information is
currently available to the public, posting the Form D at an easily accessible
location—such as the SEC’s website or, better yet, the company’s website—
would provide a centralized source from which investors could draw accurate
information. For example, investors could more easily reference an answer to a
question in a Form D found on a unicorn’s website, such as “list the board
members and the number of votes he or she has,” instead of searching for the
answer within the often-complex Restated Certificate of Incorporation. Information such as number of employees and amount of revenue should also be
easy to access. Currently, a stockholder would need to search the Internet to try
find that information—often in vain.
316

See id.
See id. at 9. The Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock,
and Series F Preferred Stock have separate conversion arrangements. See id. at 9–12.
318
See id. at 2–3.
319
See id. at 20–24 (enumerating a long list of specific occurrences that would necessitate a Preferred Stock or Series Preferred vote, as applicable).
320
This is only the case if the Board approves the repurchase, as stated in the Uber Restated Certificate. See id. at 20.
317
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In conclusion, although Form D provides general information about the
offering, revising it to include additional information is critical, particularly for
the benefit of those who are not major investors. 321 Additionally, although the
Restated Certificates of Incorporation for these companies provide detailed
information about the control and power dynamics within a company, that information is not readily accessible, nor is it easily understood by a layperson
without the help of legal counsel. Therefore, this Article proposes modifying
the information required by Form D to provide more relevant and understandable information to employees, minority stockholders, and others. Just as the
securities filings of public companies are required to be on such companies’
websites, a unicorn’s Form D should be available in that manner as well. In
addition, periodic disclosure of financial information should also be accessible
by minority stockholders who otherwise do not receive such information.
IV. PRIVATE IPOS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY AND EQUITY
Part III highlights the need for more disclosure and details how unicorns
are operating in a world of rumor and conjecture. This Part demonstrates how
the problem is exacerbated by the fact that many unicorns are staying private
longer despite calls for them to go public. 322 Indeed, although many private
companies have raised incredibly large rounds of financing, there has been no
stampede of unicorns heading for the nearest exit. 323 In fact, investors appear
to be doubling down on the hottest unicorns. For example, in the case of Uber,
Morgan Stanley’s wealthiest clients were given the opportunity to invest in a
special fund offering $475 million of new preferred stock in the company. 324
321

See supra notes 53–67 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Biz Carson, Fred Wilson: Uber’s Travis Kalanick Is ‘Wimping Out’ and Needs to
‘Take the G------ Company Public,’ BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2016, 1:39 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/fred-wilson-criticizes-uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-for-waiting-to-ipo-2016-2 [https://perma.
cc/3QDM-BNBV] (quoting a prominent venture capitalist, Fred Wilson, who commented on the
dearth of tech IPOs by comparing going public to taking medicine: “[i]t doesn’t taste good . . . [b]ut it
makes you better”). There are signs, however, that the mega-rounds of financing allowing companies
to stay private longer are cooling. See Are Mega-Rounds Over? $100M+ Rounds Almost Cut in Half
in Q4’15, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/2015-startup-megarounds/?utm_source=CB+Insights+Newsletter&utm_campaign=10f15fb8db-GamingEcosystem_02_
01_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9dc0513989-10f15fb8db-86759461 [https://perma.cc/
8HYD-QPBQ] (citing seventy-two $100-million-plus equity financings to VC-backed companies
during the third quarter of 2015 compared to thirty-eight such deals in the last quarter of 2015).
323
The high valuations of many of these private, venture-backed companies have essentially priced
these companies out of the mergers and acquisitions market. By May 2014, six U.S. venture-backed
technology companies had exits valued at $1 billion or more on the mergers and acquisitions front. See
Uh Oh VCs—Unicorn M&A Exit Volume Falls off a Cliff in 2015, CB INSIGHTS (May 24, 2015),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/unicorn-acquisitions-2015-ytd/ [https://perma.cc/PK8J-3VAY].
324
Leslie Picker & Peter Eavis, Deal Shows Investors Are Willing to Make a Blind Bet on Uber,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/business/dealbook/deal-showsinvestors-are-willing-to-make-a-blind-bet-on-uber.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/64KF-H56K].
322
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There is no financial data on Uber in the deal documents; Morgan Stanley admits “that it ‘has conducted limited due diligence’ . . . [and] has not ‘independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information.’” 325
In the first three months of 2015, in the San Francisco Bay area alone,
nearly $5 billion in private money was invested in 300 deals. 326 One reporter
noted that during that time, “Only five companies from the region went public
. . . raising less than half a billion dollars. That compares to nine IPOs in the
region in last year’s first quarter, raising about $1.2 billion.” 327 From 2012
through 2014, on average there were thirty-six venture-backed tech IPOs per
year; in 2015 there were twenty-three. 328 In short, “profitability of the typical
technology company plunged into negative territory over the past couple of
years.” 329 Historically, IPOs or mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) of private
companies that venture capitalists have funded provide the lucrative exits these
investors seek for their investments. On the acquisition side, 459 venturebacked companies were acquired in 2014, 330 of which “137 had disclosed values totaling $47.5 billion—roughly three times the prior year’s amount.”331 For
example, Oculus VR, WhatsApp, and Nest Labs were each acquired for billions of dollars by large technology companies.332 In 2014, 115 venture-backed
325

Id.
Cromwell Schubarth, First Quarter IPO Scorecard: Few in Pipeline Made Their Move, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 11:31 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20150404001007/http://
www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/blog/techflash/2015/04/first-quarter-ipo-scorecard-few-in-pipelinemade.html.
327
Id. One author states:
326

Only seven VC-backed tech companies have gone public . . . [as of June 2015], with
just one more (Fitbit) currently on the pricing calendar for June. . . . Moreover, there
have been only two strategic sales of VC-backed tech companies valued at over $1 billion (Lynda.com to LinkedIn and Virtustream to EMC). What good is it to have a stable
of unicorns if you don’t ever ride them?
Dan Primack, Something Is Rotting Under Silicon Valley, FORTUNE (June 10, 2015, 1:35 PM), https://
fortune.com/2015/06/10/something-is-rotting-under-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/BD75-WN6Z].
Fitbit went public on June 18, 2015, taking the total number of VC-backed tech companies to eight.
See Corrie Driebusch, Fitbit IPO Prices at $20 a Share, Above Expectations, WALL STREET J. (June
17, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fitbit-ipo-prices-at-20-a-share-above-expectations1434582147 [https://perma.cc/NL7E-MSD6]. If the current pace of VC-backed tech companies going
public continues, the United States is on track to have the lowest number of VC-backed tech IPOs
since 2009, when the United States was in the middle of the financial crisis. See Primack, supra.
328
See Cohan, supra note 144.
329
Id.
330
See NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 10.
331
Id.
332
Ben Zimmer, How ‘Unicorns’ Became Silicon Valley Companies, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 20,
2015, 10:26 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-unicorns-became-silicon-valley-companies-1426
861606 [https://perma.cc/2JTV-W77Y]. Unicorns are “increasingly getting gobbled up by other tech
firms willing to spend billions, with Facebook acquiring the messaging service WhatsApp and virtualreality firm Oculus VR, Google acquiring household-device maker Nest Labs and Microsoft acquiring
the game company Mojang.” Id.
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companies went public, 333 which “generated $121.1 billion in valuation that
was generated by $13.8 billion total venture investment in those companies.” 334 Corporate venture capital (“CVC”), in particular, had a banner year.
According to the 2015 NVCA Yearbook, “[C]orporate venture investment dollars increased 69% in 2014 and actually increased overall share. Corporate
groups deployed an estimated $5.3 billion into 766 venture rounds. That’s the
highest investment total by far in the post-millennium period.”335 In 2015, corporate venture groups “deployed over $7.5 billion in 905 deals to high-growth
startups,” hitting a fifteen-year high. 336
A ten-year study, however, tells a less rosy picture. This study analyzed a
dataset of $1-billion-plus exits (which excluded companies that were still private) from January 1, 2004, to June 30, 2014. The authors’ findings were as
follows:
During this 10-year period, there have been approximately 62 venture-backed unicorns that exited via IPO or M&A for $1 billion+.
There were 451 investors who backed these 62 unicorns, including
339 investments by traditional venture capital funds. Seventy-four
different venture capital funds made these 339 unicorn investments. . . . Roughly just one-fourth returned an entire fund for any
of their VC investors. 337
The study concluded that “out of 339 VC investments in unicorns over the last
10 years, only 21, around 7 percent, returned an entire fund.” 338 In 2015, there
were seventy-two VC-backed companies that went public raising a total of $8
billion; only 18% were from the tech industry. 339 The number of IPOs and acquisitions for venture-backed companies in 2015 declined from 2014 while the

333

This is the highest count of venture-backed IPOs since the 2000 bubble. See NVCA YEARsupra note 4, at 10.
334
Id.
335
Id. at 9.
336
Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Corporate Venture Investment to Entrepreneurial
Ecosystem Hits Fifteen Year High in 2015 (Jan. 19, 2016), http://nvca.org/pressreleases/corporateventure-investment-to-entrepreneurial-ecosystem-hits-fifteen-year-high-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/
UN84-TT8D].
337
John Backus & Hemant Bhardwaj, Update: Unicorns vs. Dragons, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 14,
2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/12/14/unicorns-vs-dragons/ [https://perma.cc/HHW5-G7D7].
338
Id. Putting this into context, if a venture capital firm raised $100 million for one of its funds, a
$5-million investment in a unicorn may lead to a return of $100 million—the size of the entire fund.
339
See 2015 in Review: IPO Winners and Losers, PITCHBOOK DATA, INC. (Jan. 5, 2016), http://
pitchbook.com/news/articles/2015-in-review-ipo-winners-and-losers [https://perma.cc/7MM2-HSAF]
(noting that United States healthcare startups fared better than their tech counterparts).
BOOK,
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amount of money contributed by CVCs continued to remain steady, comprising 25% of deals for the last five quarters. 340
Although the number of venture rounds has declined, both venture valuations and capital invested continued to rise until the third quarter of 2015. 341
There has been increased momentum of the venture capital market since the
economic downturn of 2009. 342 In the last quarter of 2015, however, there was
a substantial decline in investment dollars for startups.343 Furthermore, venture
capital firms raised less money and closed fewer funds in 2015 than in 2014.344
The non-existent IPO market, decline in acquisitions, and slowing of investment dollars suggest that unicorns will remain private for the foreseeable future. They will either continue to do business, raise money, hire employees,
and issue stock with little to no transparency or simply become one of the socalled unicorpses and cease to exist. 345
CONCLUSION
Unicorns still capture the imagination of the venture capital industry and
media alike. But for how much longer will the large infusion of cash and optimism last? Not everyone has such a rosy take on the outlook for the unicorns—some industry insiders are predicting the demise of some subset of the
species. For example, at the annual SXSW (South by Southwest) Interactive
festival in Austin, Texas, one prominent venture capitalist remarked, “I do
think you’ll see some dead unicorns.”346 In 2015, these pessimistic voices were
340

See Corporates Are in 25% of Deals to Startups Globally, and Even More in Asia, CB INSIGHTS
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/corporate-participation-startup-funding-2015/ [https://
perma.cc/5JCW-GAZL] (citing strong overall momentum for CVCs in North America).
341
Tom Moskal, Top 5 Takeaways from 1H 2015 VC Valuations & Trends, PITCHBOOK DATA,
INC. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://blog.pitchbook.com/top-5-takeaways-from-1h-2015-vc-valuations-trends/
[https://perma.cc/DM8G-X9N7].
342
See PITCHBOOK DATA, INC., VENTURE INDUSTRY REPORT: 4Q 2015 (2015), http://files.
pitchbook.com/pdf/PitchBook_4Q2015_U.S._Venture_Industry_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EGNTFTN].
343
See PITCHBOOK DATA, INC., U.S. VENTURE INDUSTRY REPORT (2016), http://files.pitchbook.
com/pdf/2015%20Annual%20U.S.%20Venture%20Industry%20Reporthej.pdf [https://perma.cc/
732G-5T58].
344
Lizette Chapman, Tech Funding Slowdown Hits Venture Capital Firms, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan.
12, 2016, 3:51 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-12/tech-funding-slowdown-hitsventure-capital-firms [https://perma.cc/Z8ZJ-PSW8]. Established venture capital firms raised the majority of the funds. See id. (stating that one venture capital firm, New Enterprise Associate, raised a record
amount in its firm’s history: $2.8 billion and a $350-million side vehicle).
345
Erin Griffith, Prediction: Unicorn Investing Will Get Ugly in 2016, FORTUNE (Dec. 7, 2015,
10:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/12/07/unicorn-investing-unicorpses/ [https://perma.cc/4HAKPSPU] (predicting that unicorn investing will turn ugly in 2016, leading to workarounds such as trading shares on the secondary markets). “Expect wild discrepancies in valuations; angry finger-pointing
among investors, boards and CEOs; and maybe even some private company shareholder activism.” Id.
346
Zimmer, supra note 332.
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largely drowned out by the clamor of investors looking for the next unicorn,
which may not be as elusive an animal as it once was. The end of 2015, however, saw an increase in negative sentiment as evidenced by mutual fund
markdowns, fewer unicorn births, and a substantial decrease in mega-round
financings. 347
The goal of this Article is not to argue that the current framework of venture capital deals does not work; in fact, on the contrary, it does work—and
works quite well. It is the regulatory structure underlying these deals that needs
to be addressed, particularly in the case of unicorns. In light of their enormous
influence and impact, enhanced disclosure becomes necessary when private
companies reach the size equivalent to or greater than public companies. For
reasons of both efficiency and transparency, this additional disclosure (which
would not be required of the vast majority of private companies) could be
made through Form D and simply posted on the company’s website. Additionally, periodic disclosure of financial information should be made available to
all stockholders and employees, with key terms summarized in laypeople’s
terms. Providing this information to these stakeholders would be relatively
simple because companies are already contractually obligated to furnish it to
their major investors.
Although the restated certificates of incorporation are public documents,
the Delaware Secretary of State only provides them for a fee.348 Therefore, the
restated certificates of incorporation for unicorns should be posted on the
SEC’s website and on unicorns’ websites, and the key aspects of these restated
certificates should be disclosed on the Form D in layperson’s terms. If the unicorn relied on section 4(a)(2), then information similar to what it would provide to unaccredited investors should be made more broadly available, such as
on the company’s website. Both current and prospective investors, regardless
of their stake in the private company, would then have access to more pertinent
information about their current or prospective investment, much as they would
in the case of a public company. And employees who are minority stockholders
would have access to this same information, as well.
In the cash-rich environment in which unicorns came into being, it was
easy for investors—both large and small alike—and employees to get caught
up in the excitement of investing in companies that revolutionize the way that
we have always done things or disrupt the status quo. Now, however, is the
time to exercise some caution. Now is the time to look seriously at whether
347
See RIP Good Times? Venture Capital Funding, Unicorn Births, and Mega-Deals Plummet in
Q4’15, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/venture-capital-fall/ [https://
perma.cc/J635-W682].
348
In various conversations about this Article, a few suggested that media outlets should obtain
copies of unicorns’ restated certificates of incorporation to provide more information and better perspective about what types of deals investors strike with unicorns.

642

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 57:583

having more and better information available to the public can help both investors and employees make more informed decisions when choosing whether to
ride a unicorn.

